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INTRODUCTION

"On the sunburned edge of Onslow County where the shimmering New River dances under the summer sun, shellfish harvesters . . . dropped their oyster rakes and clenched their hands in

anger."' They were reacting to a recent North Carolina Supreme
Court decision 2 which held that lands under navigable waters beCopyright 0 1989 by Valerie B. Spalding.
*

B.A. 1971, University of Auckland, New Zealand; J.D. 1987, Campbell Uni-

versity School of Law. Associate Attorney General, Department of Justice, State
of North Carolina. Research Assistant to Associate Justice Louis B. Meyer, North
Carolina Supreme Court, 1987-1989. The author wishes to thank Justice Meyer
not only for permission to write this article, but also for two years of delightful
learning experience. In addition, the author wishes to thank Pamela Britt, Executive Assistant to Justice Meyer, for her contributions to the editing and production of this article.
1. Raleigh News and Observer, July 19, 1988, at 1C, col. 1.
2. State ex rel. Rohrer v. Credle, 322 N.C. 522, 369 S.E.2d 825 (1988) [herein-
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longed to the state in "public trust." Environmentalists and state
attorneys, on the other hand, hailed the ruling as a victory.'
Although the legal literature on the subject of the public trust
doctrine in the United States is voluminous," the State v. Credle
after "State v. Credle"].
3. Raleigh News and Observer, July 18, 1988, at 1C, col. 3.
4. Baer, The Public Trust Doctrine:A Tool to make Federal Administrative
Agencies Increase Protection of Public Land and its Resources , 15 N.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 385 (1988); Cummings, Book Review, Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trust, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 217 (1988); Attwater & Markle, Overview of California Water Rights and Water Quality Law, 19 PAC. L.J. 957 (1988); Davis,
Protecting Waste Assimilation Streamflows by the Law of Water Allocation,
Nuisance, and Public Trust, and.:by Environmental Statutes, 28 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 357 (1988); Note, The Public Trust Doctrine: Accommodating the Public Need
Within Constitutional.Bounds, .63 WASH. L. REV. 1087 (1988); Hollman, The
Struggle for Alaska's Submerged Lands, 5 ALASKA L. REV. 69 (1988); Antone, The
Public Trust Doctrine and Related Michigan Environmental Legislation, 66
MICH. B.J. 894 (1987); Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause through the Myth
of Public Rights: the Public Trust and Reserved Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 171 (1987); Michigan Water Law, 66 MICH. B.J. 852 (1987);
Kiefer, The Public Trust Doctrine: State Limitations on Private Waterfront Development, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 146 (1987); Note, Florida Supreme Court Renews
"Public Trust" in Florida Legislature and Trustees: Coastal Petroleum Co. v.
American Cyanmid Co., 16 STETSON L. REV. 959 (1987); Carlisle, The Section
1983 Land Use Case: Justice Stevens and the Hunt for the Talking Quark, 16
STETSON L. REV. 565 (1987); Jarman, Of Time, Tidelands and Public Trust, 57
Miss. L.J. 131 (1987); Allison, The Public Trust Doctrine in Washington, 10 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 633 (1987); Oehme, Judicial Expansion of the Public Trust
Doctrine: Creatinga Right of Public Access to Florida'sBeaches, 3 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 75 (1987); Note, An Analysis of the Potential Conflict between the
PriorAppropriation and Public Trust Doctrines in Montana Water Law, 8 PUB.
LAND L. REV. 81 (1987); Comment, Sand Rights: Using California'sPublic Trust
Doctrine to Protect Against Coastal Erosion, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 727 (1987);
Walston, The Public Trust and Water Rights: National Audubon Society v. Superior Court), 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 701 (1987); Note, The Mono Lake Problem and the Public Trust Solution, 7 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 67 (1987); Comment, Private Rights and the Public Trust: Opposing Lakeshore Funnel Development, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 105 (1987); Note, The Preservationof Florida's Public Trust Doctrine, 11 NOVA L.J. 227 (1986); Comment, The Bay and
Estuaries Section of the 1985 Texas Water Bill: Drowning the Public Trust Doctrine, 23 Hous. L. REV. 907 (1986); Comment, A New Approach to Spanish and
Mexican Land Grants and the Public Trust Doctrine: Defining the Property Interest Protected by the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo,33 UCLA L. REV. 1364
(1986); Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Tool for Expanding Recreational Rafting Rights in Colorado, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 625 (1986); Comment,
Sealing Pandora'sBox: JudicialDoctrines Restricting Public Trust Citizen Environmental Suits, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 439 (1986): Kalo & Kalo, The
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol12/iss1/2
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decision deserves attention because it has had, and will continue to
Battle to Preserve North Carolina's Estuarine Marshes: The 1985 Legislation,
Private Claims to Estuarine Marshes, Denial of Permits to Fill, and the Public
Trust, 64 N.C.L. REV. 565 (1986); Dunning, The "Physical Solution" in Western
Water Law, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 445 (1986); Washburn, The FederalNavigational
Servitude and the CaliforniaPublic Trust for Commerce, Navigation, and Fishing: An Overview of Federal and State Legislative Schemes Identifying Lands
Subject to these NavigationalServitudes, 13 WASH. ST. U.L. REV. 525 (1986); Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources:
Questioningthe Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986); Parker, California Tidelands and Wetlands: Special Comment, 13 WASH. ST. U.L. REV. 523
(1986); Ausness, Water Rights, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of
Instream Uses, U. ILL. L. REV. 407 (1986); Jarman, The Public Trust Doctrine in
the Exclusive Economic Zone, 65 OR. L. REV. 1 (1986); Huffman, Trusting the
Public Interest of Judges: A Comment on the Public Trust Writings of Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunningand Johnson, 63 DEN. U.L. J. 565 (1986); Note, The
Public Trust Doctrine as a Source of State Reserved Water Rights, 63 Den. U.L.
J. 585 (1986); Graff, Environmental Quality, Water Marketing and the Public
Trust: Can They Coexist? 5 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 137 (1986); Reed, The
Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious? 1 J. ENVTL. L. LITIGATION 107 (1986);
Note, Access to New Jersey Beaches: The Public Trust Doctrine, 20 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PROBS. 437 (1986); Bozung, Public Trust Doctrine and Transfer Development Rights, 20 REAL PROP. PROBS. & TRIAL J. 975 (1986); Lahey, Waterfront
Development and the Public Trust Doctrine, 70 MASS. L. REv. 55 (1985); Comment, Sunbathers Versus Property Owners: Public Access to North Carolina
Beaches, 64 N.C.L. REV. 159 (1985); Maleski, Sociobiology and the California
Public Trust Doctrine: the New Synthesis Applied, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 429
(1985); Stevens, Life, Liberty, and the Right to Navigate: Justice Mosk and the
Public Trust, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421 (1985); A Tribute to Justice Stanley
Mosk, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 365 (1985); Dollahite, Morrison, The Public Trust
Doctrine: Insuring the Needs of Texas Bays and Estuaries, 37 BAYLOR L. REV.
365 (1985); Note, Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Commission: A
New Limitation on Public Trust Easements, 6 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 235 (1985);
Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine in Maine's Submerged Lands: Public
Rights, State Obligation and the Role of the Courts, 37 ME. L. REV. 105 (1985);
Fellig, Pursuit of the Public Trust: Beach Access in New Jersey from Neptune v.
Avon to Matthews v. BHIA, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 35 (1985). Note, Public Trust
Doctrine: Beach Access: The Public's Right to Cross and to Use Privately Owned
Upper Beach Areas - Matthews v. BHIA, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 344 (1985);
Note, Reconciling the Public Trust and Appropriative Water Rights in California: National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 219
(1984); Note, Water Rights - Public Trust Doctrine - The Courts and the State
Water Resources Control Board Have Concurrent Jurisdictionin Applying the
Public Trust Doctrine to California'sAppropriative Water Rights System, 61 U.
DET. J. URn. L. 321 (1984); Note, The Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts
Land Law, 11 B.C. ENVT. ApF. L. REV. 839 (1984); Comment, The Fifth Amendment as a Limitation on the Public Trust Doctrine in Water Law, 15 Pac. L.J.
1291 (1984); Note, Water Law - Public Trust Doctrine, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 809
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have, major ramifications in the area of environmental law in
North Carolina. It is the most significant public trust opinion from
the North Carolina Supreme Court in eighty-five years.
(1984); Comment, The Emergence of the Public Trust Doctrine as a Public Right
to Environmental Preservationin South Dakota, 29 S.D.L. REV. 496 (1984); Note,
Protecting the People's Waters: The California Supreme Court Recognizes Two
Remedies to Safeguard Public Trust Interests in Water: National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 59 WASH. L. REV. 357 (1984); Note, Navigable Waters Public Trust Doctrine - The Public May Have a Right to Use Privately Owned
Beaches for Recreation But the Extent of Any Such Right Will be Determined
with a Location by Location Test: Matthews v. BHIA, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 813
(1984); Note, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court: The Expanding Public Trust Doctrine, 14 ENVTL. L. 617 (1984); Wilson, Private Property and the
Public Trust: A Theory for Preserving the Coastal Zone, 4 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 57 (1984); Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law:
Discord or Harmony? 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17.1 (1984); Comment, The
Public Trust Doctrine Expansion and Integration: A Proposed Balancing Test,
23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 211 (1983); Arnold, Public Trusts in Oklahoma, 19
TULSA L.J. 192 (1983); Note, The Public Trust After Lyon and Fogerty: Private
Interests and Public Expectations - A New Balance, 16 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 631
(1983); Symposium on Access to Waterways, 16 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 573 (1983);
Carlson, The Public Trust and Urban Waterfront Development in Massachusetts: What is a Public Purpose? 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 71 (1983); Seldon, Wherever the Water Flows: Lyon Applies the Public Trust to Non-tidal Water, 11
ECOLOGY L.Q. 21 (1983); Smith, The Public Trust Doctrine and National Audubon Society v. Superior Court: A Hard Case makes Bad Law or the Consistent
Evolution of California Water Rights, 6 GLENDALE L. REV. 201 (1983/1984); Note,
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court: A Watershed Case Integrating the
Public Trust Doctrine and California Water Law, 5 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 121
(1983); Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context: The
Wrong Environmental Remedy, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63 (1982); Beynon, The
Private Law of Public Trusts, 45 MOD. L. REV. 268 (1982); Comment, The Public
Trust Doctrine and California Water Law: National Audubon Society v. Department of Water and Power, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 653 (1982); Jawetz, The Public Trust
Totem in Public Land Law: Ineffective- and Undesirable -JudicialIntervention,
10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 455 (1982); Chapman, Regulating Fills in Estuaries: The Public
Trust Doctrine in Oregon, 61 OR. L. REV. 523 (1982); Comment, Public Beach
Access Exactions: Extending the Public Trust Doctrine to Vindicate Public
Rights, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1049 (1981); Note, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Basis
for Environmental Litigation in Louisiana, 27 LoY. L. REV. 469 (1981); Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 185 (1980); Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative
Becomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 195 (1980);
Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged
Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970). This list does not purport to be
complete.

5. Raleigh News and Observer, July 15, 1988, at 1A, col. 2 (comment from J.
Allen Jernigan, assistant attorney general).
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The first part of this article will trace the history of the public
trust doctrine from Roman times, through its application in
England, and thence to its development in the United States to
the present. The more important issues associated with the doctrine, such as the constitutional "takings clause" argument, will be
discussed. The second part of the article will trace the public trust
doctrine in North Carolina and explore the underpinnings and rationale of the State v. Credle decision. It will also discuss the issues raised in part one with regard to their application in North
Carolina. Finally, the article will consider the practical effects of
the opinion upon the environment and the people of this state.
II.

A.

HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

Roman Beginnings

The public trust doctrine, which began at the edge of the sea,'
is two thousand years old.7 The doctrine derived from Roman law,
which in turn derived from the Greeks.8 The Roman economy relied heavily on free trade and commerce, so that public access to
the sea and freedom of navigation were essential.9 In Roman jurisprudence, public rights in the sea and the seashore were justified
by a "natural law" concept, which held that some things, by their
very nature, are common to all people. 10
Things common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea; no
man therefore is prohibited from approaching any part of the seashore, whilst he abstains from damaging farms, monuments, edifices, etc., which are not in common as the sea is. 1
6. Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious? 1 ENVTL. LAW AND
107 (1986).
7. Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine Expansion and Integration: A
Proposed Balancing Test, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 211 (1983). The author comments that the doctrine "is imbued with as much lore and confusion as were the
sea dragons once rumored to exist in the [Greek, Roman, and English) waters."
Id. at 212.
8. Tannenbaum, The Public Trust Doctrine in Maine's Submerged Lands:
Public Rights, State Obligation and the Role of the Courts, 37 ME. L. REv. 105
(1985).
9. Id. See also Butler, The Commons Concept: An Historical Concept with
Modern Relevance, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 835 (1982); Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976).
10. Tannenbaum, supra note 8, at 108.
11. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, 2.1.1, quoted in Butler, supra note 9, at
LITIGATION
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The philosophic rationale of this concept was that the sea, the seashores, and their resources are a "vast, inexhaustible commons

whose wealth can and should be shared by all."12 THE INSTITUTES
OF JUSTINIAN, a principal source of Roman law, stated that the
rights to which the public was entitled included those of navigation
and fishing in all waters navigable in fact, as well as access to the
seashore and its use for unloading cargo, fastening boats, and drying fishing nets."3 All these rights could be eliminated by acquisition of exclusive private ownership either by occupation or by direct state grants."' In addition, littoral owners had the right to
exclusive occupancy of waterfront improvements for as long as the
improvements remained standing.'5 In time, however, the sophisticated Roman legal system fell into decline, as did the Empire itself. The idea of common ownership of the sea was replaced as feu849-50.

12. Jarman, Of Time, Tidelands, and Public Trust, 57 Miss. L.J. 131 (1987).
13. All rivers and harbors, moreover, are public, and therefore there is a
right of fishing, common to all, therein. The seashore extends as far as
the highest winter waves. The public use of the banks [of a river] is also
governed by the law of nations, just as the rivers themselves are, and
therefore everyone is free to bring his ship to the banks, to tie lines to
the trees growing there, and to rest his cargo on them, just as he is free
to navigate on the river itself. The banks themselves, however, are the
property of the owner of the adjacent estate, and therefore the trees
growing on the banks are also his. The public use of the beaches is also
governed by the law of nations, just as is the public use of the sea itself,
and therefore anyone is free to build thereon a cottage [for retreat] as
well as to dry his nets thereon and to draw them out of the sea. If [sic]
may be said that the ownership of the beaches is in no one, but that they
are governed by the same law as the sea and the soil and sand which lie
beneath it.
THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, 2.1.1-5, quoted in Tannenbaum, supra note 8, at
108. One commentator suggests that this declaration more probably reflects Justinian's idealization of a legal regime than the true nature of public rights during
the Roman Empire, since Justinian intended THE INSTITUTES as an elementary
textbook for first-year law students. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property
and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine,
71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 634 (1886).
14. Tannenbaum, supra note 8, at 108. See also L. BUTLER & M. LIVINGSTON,
VIRGINIA TIDAL AND COASTAL LAW (1988). The Roman government was not averse

to conveying private rights in coastal resources, in order to promote their commercial exploitation. Lazarus, supra note 13, at 634.
15. Kiefer, The Public Trust Doctrine: State Limitations on Private Waterfront Development, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 146 (1987).
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dalism grew. 6 Tidelands and navigable waters became subject to
feudal ownership. The feudal lords claimed the right to control
17
navigation, fishing, and other water-based activities.
Prior to its collapse, the Roman Empire's concept of the "commons" spread along the European shorelines in civil law jurisdictions.' 8 For example, the legal principle found its way into French
law (thence to Louisianian law)' 9 and into Spanish law (thence to
Mexican law20 and, ultimately, to Californian law). 2' It then
crossed the English Channel, bridging a contrary language and
property concept in the process.2 2
B. English Development
In England, the King claimed private ownership of all coastal
lands and water, with the right to alienate them to his subjects
without restriction. Over time, the King granted a great proportion
of England's coastal waterways to the lords who were loyal to him.
Sovereign lands were thus divested in the same way as private
property.2 3 This resulted in abuses and inconveniences.24 Although
16. Tannenbaum, supra note 8, at 108.
17. Kiefer, supra note 15, at 147.
18. Reed, supra note 6, at 109-10.
19. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d 576, 581-82 n.2 (La.
1975), the Louisiana Supreme Court cited several provisions of the state civil code
mandating that air, running water, and the sea are held in common for the use
and benefit of all people. The court stated that these provisions could be traced
back to THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, the Napoleon Code, and Toullier, Le droit
civil francais (Tome Troisieme 1839).
20. Las Siete Partidas, a thirteenth century Spanish law applied to California
while it was part of Mexico and thereafter under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsular Properties, 31 Cal. 3d 288, 298
n.8, 644 P.2d 792, 797 n.8 (1982), rev'd sub nom. Summa Corp. v. California ex
rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984).
21. Fahmy, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Source of State Reserved Water
Rights, 63 DEN. U.L. REV. 585, 587 (1986).
22. Reed, supra note 6, at 107. See also H. ALTHAUS, PUBLIC TRUST RIGHTS 170 (1978), for a discussion of the early history and movement of the public trust
doctrine.
23. Jarman, supra note 12, at 131-32. See generally Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L.
REV. 473 passim (1969); Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 195
passim (1980).
24. Note, The Public Trust Doctrine in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 765 (1970).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1989
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the English economy was dependent on the sea, the magnitude of
private ownership of the shores was such that the lack of public
access to them resulted in a detrimental impact on local commerce.2" This impact was one of the factors which led to the adoption of the Magna Carta in 1215.
The Magna Carta brought the alienation and thus the privatization of public lands to a halt.26 Although the Magna Carta did

not itself expressly grant rights to the public, it established the
roots of the law of public trust in modern times. 7 The document
impressed a narrow set of restrictions upon the power of the King
and the lords to obstruct navigation and claim exclusive fisheries. 8
It permitted the King to retain his sovereign rights in tidal lands
and resources up to the high water mark, while at the same time
prohibiting exclusive alienation to private parties (usually the nobility) for private use. 9 In spite of the narrow restrictions in the
Magna Carta, the document was always broadly interpreted to increase their scope, so that eventually it developed into one of the
major sources of authority on the question of public rights in England's navigable waters.30 The rights included navigation and fishing in tidal waters below the natural high tide line."' Over time,
the English common law split the title to tidelands into the jus
25. Tannenbaum, supra note 8, at 109.
26. The question is not free from doubt, and the authorities referred to
in the English books cannot, perhaps, be altogether reconciled ...
But ... the question must be regarded as settled in England against the
rights of the king since the Magna Charta to make such a grant [of submerged lands]....
But the existence of a doubt as to the right of the king to make such a
grant after Magna Charta, would of itself show how fixed has been the
policy of that government on this subject for the last six hundred years;
and how carefully it has preserved this common right for the benefit of
the public.
Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410-13 (1842).
27. Jarman, supra note 12, at 132.
28. Tannenbaum, supra note 8, at 109.
29. Jarman, supra note 12, at 132. For a discussion of the Magna Carta's
specific restrictions, such as prohibiting fish weirs in inland waterways, see Butler,
The Commons Concept: An Historical Concept with Modern Relevance, 23 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 835 (1982); Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust:
An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976).
30. Tannenbaum, supra note 8, at 109. In England, all navigable waters are
subject to the tides. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
31. Tannenbaum, supra note 8, at 109.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol12/iss1/2
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regium, the sovereign's police power to manage the King's coastal
resources for the people's welfare;32 the jus privatum, the alienable
private right of the King;', and the jus publicum, the inalienable
public rights of navigation and fishery." The latter rights were
held by the King in trust for the benefit of all his subjects.3 8 Eventually, Parliament took responsibility for the jus publicum. 6 Public easements of use were thus guaranteed for navigation, fishing,
and commerce and, although subject to Parliamentary restraint
and modification, were paramount to any private ownership of the
shoreline or waters. 37 The rights derived from the Magna Carta applied only to salt water,38 but they nevertheless are generally
agreed to have formed one of the bases of the public trust doctrine
as we know it in the United States today. 9
32. Id. at 120.
33. Any such conveyance, however, could not affect the jus publicum, which
the King had no power to abolish. Id.
34. Only the properties of the "ancient desmesne" were historically inalienable under the English law. These lands were the "original endowment of the kingship" designated at the time that "settlement of the Conquest was completed and
was registered in the Domesday Book." 1 F. POLLOCK & W.

MAITLAND, HISTORY OF

383-84 (2d rev. ed. 1968).
35. "The king, by virtue of his proprietary interest, could grant the soil, so

ENGLISH LAW

that it should become private property, but his grant was subject to the ...

right

of public use of navigable waters, which he could neither destroy nor abridge."
People v. New York and Staten Island Ferry Co. 68 N.Y. 71, 76 (1877). In De
Jure Marls et Brachiorum Ejusdem, Lord Hale accepted that England's title
lands were prima facie held by the King, but the ownership was not absolute
because he could not infringe on the public's protected rights. M. Hale, id. (circa
1667).
36. Kiefer, supra note 15, at 148. See also Note, The Public Trust Doctrine
in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged TraditionalDoctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762,
764-65 (1970). Lazarus maintains that English assertions of public rights held by
the Crown were merely one means of increasing the treasury. Lazarus, supra note
13, at 634-35 & nn.12, 19.
37. Note, Water Law: Public Trust Doctrine, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 809, 812
(1984).
38. Reed, supra note 6, at 107.
39. One of the writers on the public trust doctrine maintains that the public
trust came into our English common law heritage through the mid-thirteenth century writings of Bracton, who borrowed the Roman notion of "commons." Lazarus, supra note 13 at 635. Professor Sax, however, suggests that eleventh-century
French law may offer the best historical precedent for the modern public trust
doctrine. "'[T]he public highways and byways, running water and springs, meadows, pastures, forests, heaths and rocks... are not to be held by lords.., nor are
they to be maintained... in any other way than that their people may always be
able to use them.'" Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its Historical
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1989
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C. American Adaptation
English common law arrived in this country with the colonists.
The notion of reserved public rights in tidelands and navigable waters entered into the law through various colonial enactments
which granted title to the foreshore in the owner of the adjacent
upland, subject to the public rights. 40 American topography, however, is entirely different from the English seas and shores. Unlike
England, this country contains numerous large rivers and lakes
which are not subject to the tides but are nevertheless important
for navigation, commerce, and fishing. 4 1 Because an individual's
ability to use water resources for navigation, commerce, and fishing
is an important indicia of a free society, 42 the public's rights were
changed here, too, in order to meet the differing conditions. In
the nineteenth century, commerce was primarily waterborne; the
rivers were highways for pioneers and power sources for fledgling
industries. Cities and towns developed along the major waterways,
since natural ports were a prerequisite to their development."
American judicial decisions expanded the public trust doctrine to
include upstream and inland waters which were fresh rather than
salt and were not subject to the ebb and flow of the tides.45
The three distinctions in the English public trust doctrine also
prevailed in pre-Revolutionary America: (1) jus publicum, the
rights of the general public; (2) jus regium, the royal right to manage resources for the public safety and welfare; and (3) jus
Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 189 (1980).
40. Kiefer, supra note 15, at 148. The earliest colonial enactment occurred in
the Massachusetts Bay Colony. THE COLONIAL ORDINANCE OF 1641-1647 extended
private property ownership to the low tide line, subject to the reserved public
rights of fishing, fowling, and navigation. Id.
41. Tannenbaum, supra note 8, at 109.
42. Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
43. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); The Propeller Genesee Chief v.
Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
44. Lazarus, supra note 13, at 636.
45. Reed, supra note 6, at 107; Note, Water Law: Public Trust Doctrine, 24
NAT. RESOURCES J. 809 (1984). In this century, many jurisdictions have also expanded the traditional public trust rights to include recreational uses and conservation, although the specific uses vary with the jurisdictions. See, e.g., Marks v.
Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971); Neptune City v.
Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972); Muench v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952); Diana Shooting Club v. Husting,
156 Wis. 261, 145 N.W. 816 (1914).
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privatum, the private right of title.46 At the time of independence,
the public trust doctrine was adopted in the United States on the
theory that the rights held by the English Crown accrued to the
states. The original states, therefore, acquired sovereign ownership
in trust of all the tidelands previously held by the King, with the
exception of those previously granted to private parties by the
Crown or under the authority of colonial charters.48 As each new
state entered the Union, it did so on an equal footing with the original thirteen states and succeeded to the same quantum of
ownership. "9
The first American case to recognize the public trust doctrine
was the 1821 case of Arnold v. Mundy.5 0 The New Jersey Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether a conveyance of land that
included oyster beds below the high water mark could operate to
exclude the public. The court held that, as successors to the interests previously held by the Crown, the states held rights to the
beds of navigable waters in trust for their citizens.5 1 Any grant
purporting to divest the citizens of these rights was void.52 Subsequently, in 1842, in Martin v. Lessee of Waddell,53 the United
States Supreme Court held that Waddell's title to submerged
lands below the high water mark did not give him the exclusive
right to take oysters from Raritan Bay. The Court reasoned that if
46. 1 R.

CLARK, WATERS AND

WATER RIGHTS 190-202 (1967); Sax, supra note

39; See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324
(1876); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Martin v. Lessee
of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
47. Fahmy, supra note 21, at 588.
48. Kiefer, supra note 15, at 148.
49. Martin 41 U.S. at 367; Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
50. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
51. Id. at 13.
[Ulpon the Revolution, all those royal rights vested in the people of
New Jersey, as the sovereign of the country, and are now in their hands;
and that they, having themselves both the legal estate and the usufruct,
may make such disposition of them, and such regulation concerning
them as they may think fit; that this power of disposition and regulation
can be exercised only by the legislative body, who are the representatives
of the people for this purpose... but that they cannot make a direct and
absolute grant, divesting all the citizens of their common right; such a
grant, or a law authorizing such a grant, would be contrary to the great
principles of our constitution, and never could be borne by a free people.

Id.
52. Id.
53. 41 U.S. at 367.
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the surrender of lands from the Crown to the Duke of York, the
source of Waddell's title, had been intended to sever the "right of
dominion and ownership in the rivers, bays, and arms of the sea,
and the soils under them" from the sovereign, such a conveyance
would have been express and could not be implied.5 However, in
City of Hoboken v. Penn. R.R. Co.,55 in 1888, the Court held that

state legislatures could sell public trust lands free of all trust obligations. As a result, some legislatures saw a fast route to solvency
in their shorelines and tidelands.6 In 1892, the United States Supreme Court was forced to reevaluate state power to convey abso-7
lute title to trust resources in Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois.5
This decision is the seminal public trust case in the United States
and may be said to have begun the modern formulation of the
public trust doctrine.
In Illinois Central, the Illinois legislature had granted a 1,000acre tract of reclaimed tidal and submerged land under Lake
Michigan on Chicago's waterfront to the railroad. The area comprised most of Chicago Harbor. Four years later, the legislature rescinded the grant and brought suit seeking a declaration of the
rights of the railroad company, the city, and the state. 9 Citing limitations upon the Illinois legislature derived from the public trust,
the United States Supreme Court held the conveyance to be either
inoperative ab initio or subject to repeal.6 0
The Court framed the issue in terms of the Illinois legislature's competency to make the grant to the railroad company. The
Court explained that state ownership of its submerged lands was
not comparable to a private proprietorship but, rather, entailed a
sovereign obligation, which could not be forsaken, to control and
manage the lands for the public benefit. 1 The four-justice majority
54. Id. at 416. The rights included the "right of common fishery for the common people." Id. See also Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381 (1891) (title to the
shore and lands under water is incidental to the sovereignty of the state and is
held in trust for the public purposes of navigation and fishery).
55. 124 U.S. 656 (1888).
56. Casey, supra note 45, at 813. See City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of
Alameda, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 531 n.15, 606 P.2d 362, 370-71 n.15, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327,
335-336 n.15 (1980).
57. 146 U.S. 387 (1892) [hereinafter "Illinois Central"].
58. Professor Sax describes it as the "lodestar" of the public trust doctrine.
Sax, supra note 23, at 489; Kiefer, supra note 15, at 149.
59. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 394-95.
60. Id. at 460.
61. Id. at 453.
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expounded at length on the special nature of sovereign ownership
of navigable waters to support its conclusion that the state grant
had been revocable, and was at pains to stress the special "trust"
nature of the state's title to the tidelands and submerged soil:
[State title to the lands under navigable waters] is a title different
in character from that which the State holds [in] lands intended
for sale .... It is a title held in trust for the people of the State
that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from
the obstruction or interference of private parties .... The State
can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole
people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under
them[,] ... than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace .... 62
The thrust of the opinion is unmistakable. At some level, a state
legislature is powerless to convey into private hands a natural resource as important as Chicago's harbor because of its "trust"
obligations.
The Illinois Central decision remains the "lodestar" case.
State courts have repeatedly turned to it to justify careful scrutiny
and, in many instances, outright rejection of legislative attempts to
convey critical coastal or inland waterway resources into private
hands.6 3 The decision, however, did note that a state's trust obligations do not prevent the alienation of submerged lands when the
public interest is enhanced or when the conveyance does not impair public uses of the remaining lands.6 4
After Illinois Central, the general view seemed to be that the
public trust approved and applied therein applied universally to all
the states. This view has been weakened by subsequent Supreme
Court decisions in which the Court has emphasized that public
rights in submerged lands are a matter of state law and that the
management of trust lands is for the individual state to deter62. Id. at 452-53.
63. See, e.g., Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773 (1976)
(construction of a steel plant); Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement
Co., 93 Wis. 534, 67 N.W. 918 (1896) (attempt to reclaim lake for agriculture).
64. See, e.g., Martin v. Smith, 184 Cal. App. 2d 571, 7 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1960)
(shopping complex); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 105
Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983) (yacht club); People ex rel. Moloney v. Kirk, 162
Ill. 138, 45 N.E. 830 (1896) (highway); Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 285
Or. 197, 590 P.2d 709 (1979) (airport runway).
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mine." The states have proceeded to interpret and apply the public trust doctrine in a variety of ways,". as evidenced by the more
than one hundred cases involving the public trust doctrine reported in the last twenty years."7
65. See, e.g., Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 274 U.S. 651, 655-56
(1927) ("If a state chooses to resign . . . sovereign rights over navigable rivers
which it acquired upon assuming statehood, it is not for others to raise objections."); Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926) (conclusion reached in
Illinois Central necessarily a statement of Illinois law); Port of Seattle v. Oregon
& Wash. R.R., 255 U.S. 56 (1921) (state may dispose of submerged land as it sees
fit); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 43 (1894) (individual states have authority to
allot their resources); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 380 (1891) (public rights are
a matter of state law).
66. Following is a sampling of legal literature addressing the development of
the public trust doctrine in several states. For an excellent and detailed article on
the development of the doctrine in Massachusetts, Maryland, Virginia, and Wisconsin, see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1969). For an article discussing the
public trust doctrine in Mississippi, see Jarman, Of Time, Tidelands, and Public
Trust, 57 ,Miss. L.J. 131 (1987). For an article discussing the doctrine in Maine,
see Tannenbaum, The Public Trust Doctrine in Maine's Submerged Lands: Public Rights, State Obligations and the Role of the Courts, 37 ME. L. REV. 105
(1985). See also Jaffee, The Public Trust Doctrine is Alive and Kicking in New
Jersey Tidalwaters: Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, A Case of Happy Atavism, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 309 (1974); Livingston, Public Access to Virginia's
Tidelands: A Framework for Analysis of Implied Dedications and Public Prescriptive Rights, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 669 (1983); Olson, The Public Trust
Doctrine:Proceduraland Substantive Limitations of Governmental Reallocation
of Natural Resources in Michigan, 1975 DET. C.L. REV. 161; Wyche, Tidelands
and the Public Trust: An Application for South Carolina, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 137
(1978); Note, The Public Trust in Massachusetts Land Law, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 839 (1984); Comment, The Pennsylvania Public Trust Doctrine: Its Uses
as a Restraint on Government, 13 DUQ. L. REV. 551 (1975); Comment, California
Beach Access: The Mexican Law and the Public Trust, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 571
(1972); Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Basis for EnvironmentalLitigation in Louisiana, 27 Loy. L. REV. 469 (1981); Comment, California's Tidelands
Trust for Modifiable Public Purposes, 6 LoY. L. REV. 485 (1973); Comment, The
Mississippi Public Trust Doctrine: Public and Private Rights in the Coastal
Zone, 46 Miss. L.J. 84 (1975); Comment, "Public Trust" as a ConstitutionalProvision in Montana, 33 MONT. L. REV. 175 (1972); Note, State Citizens Rights Respecting Greatwater Resource Allocation: From Rome to New Jersey, 25
RUTGERS L. REV. 571 (1971); Comment, The Emergence of the Public Trust as a
Public Right to EnvironmentalPreservationin South Dakota, 29 S.D.L. REV. 496
(1984); Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine: A New Approach to Environmental Preservation,81 W. VA. L. REV. 455 (1979). See also supra note 4.
67. Some of the more important cases include: Alaska, State Dep't of Natural Resources v. City of Haines, 627 P.2d 1047 (Alaska 1981); California,National
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A few general rules may be gleaned from the decisions. All
lands beneath waters subject to the tides, whether navigable or
not, and all lands beneath nontidal but navigable waters are subject to the public trust doctrine. 8 Each state has established its
own definition of the term "navigable water." 6 Most states own
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr.
346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Colorado, People v. Emmert, 198 Colo. 137,
597 P.2d 1025 (1979); District of Columbia, Washington Metro. Area Transit
Auth. v. One Parcel of Land, 514 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Georgia, State v.
Ashmore, 236 Ga. 401, 224 S.E.2d 334, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Florida,
Skipper v. Phipps, 483 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Fla. 1980); Hawaii, Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982); Idaho, Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc.
v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983); Illinois, People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773 (1976); Louisiana, Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152
(La. 1984); Maine, James v. Inhabitants of West Bath, 437 A.2d 863 (Me. 1981);
Massachusetts, Opinions of the Justices, 383 Mass. 895, 424 N.E.2d 1092 (1981);
Michigan, Bott v. Comm'n of Nat. Resources, 415 Mich. 45, 327 N.W.2d 838
(1982); Montana, Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 211
Mont. 29, 684 P.2d 1088 (1984); Nevada, State v. Bunkowski, 88 Nev. 623, 503
P.2d 1231 (1972); New Hampshire, Appeal of Comm. to Save the Upper Androscoggin v. New Hampshire Water Resources Bd., 124 N.H. 17, 466 A.2d 1308
(1983); New Jersey, Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 471
A.2d 355, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); New York, Evans v. City of Johnstown, 96 Misc. 2d 755, 410 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1978); North Carolina, State ex rel.
Rohrer v. Credle, 322 N.C. 522, 369 S.E.2d 825 (1988); North Dakota, North Dakota State Water Comm'n v. Bd. of Managers, 332 N.W.2d 254 (N.D. 1983); Ohio,
Thomas v. Sanders, 65 Ohio App. 2d 5, 413 N.E.2d 1224 (1979); Oregon, Morse v.
Oregon Div. of State Lands, 285 Or. 197, 590 P.2d 709 (1979); Pennsylvania, Warren Sand & Gravel Co. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 20 Pa.
Commw. 186, 341 A.2d 556 (1975); Texas, Lower Colo. River Auth. v. Texas Dep't
of Water Resources, 689 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. 1984); Wisconsin, Wisconsin's Envtl.
Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Nat. Resources, 115 Wis. 2d 381, 340 N.W.2d
722 (1983).
68. D.C. Slade, Draft Compilation: National Public Trust Study (1988)
(funded pursuant to Section 309 of the United States Coastal Zone Management
Act).
69. E.g., Connecticut, "[E]very river, where the sea ebbs and flows, is by the
common law considered as navigable and all rivers not thus distinguished are not
navigable," Adams v. Pease, 2 Conn. 481, 484 (1818); Massachusetts, public trust
is applied to "great ponds" with an area of more than ten acres, in their natural
state, and to all waters that are navigable-in-fact, Commonwealth v. Tiffany, 119
Mass. 300 (1876); Commonwealth v. Inhabitants of Charlestown, 18 Mass. (1
Pick.) 180 (1822); North Carolina,public trust ownership of lands covered by waters, whether tidal or nontidal that are "wide enough and deep enough for sea
vessels to navigate, and without any obstruction to this navigation from its mouth
to the ocean," Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 30 (1828); Oregon, navigable
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the bottoms of rivers and lakes, 70 although several provide for
some private ownership.71 For lands bordering tidal waters, the
mean high tide line forms the upper boundary of both sovereignowned tideland and the upper boundary of tideland subject to the
public trust servitude, whether state-owned or privately held. For
lands bordering nontidal, navigable waters, the upper boundary is
the ordinary high water mark. 72 Although the public trust doctrine
does not provide the public with rights of access along the dry
sand area above public trust shorelands, a growing number of
states are deciding that the public's full exercise of their public
trust rights requires limited access to the dry sand beach immediately shoreward of a sandy beach.7"
D.

Modern Interpretation
The most recent case to come from the United States Su-

preme Court is Phillips Petroleum Company v. Mississippi.7 4 At

issue were forty-two acres of land underlying the north branch of
Bayou LaCroix and eleven small drainage streams in southwestern
Mississippi. Although the waters over the lands lie several miles
north of the Mississippi Gulf Coast and are not navigable, they are
nonetheless tidally influenced as a result of adjacence to the
Jourdan River which in this area is affected by the ebb and flow of
waters are those which are "navigable-in-fact according to the federal test of navigability," State ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 283 Or.
147, 582 P.2d 1352 (1978); Texas, navigable waters are defined statutorily as those
which are navigable-in-fact as well as streams with an average width of at least
thirty feet regardless of navigability, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT., Art. 5302 (Vernon's
1962); Washington, public trust is based on navigability of the water, WASH.
CONST. art. 17, § 1; Wisconsin, navigable waterway is any water "which is capable
of floating any boat, skiff, or canoe, of the shallowest draft used for recreational
purposes," Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 506, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519
(1952).
70. E.g., Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, para. 71; Pennsylvania, Warren Sand
& Gravel Co. v. Commonwealth, 20 Pa. 186, 341 A.2d 556 (1975); Virginia, VA.
CODE ANN.

§ 62.1-1 (1987).

71. See, e.g., Texas, Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 86 S.W.2d
441 (1935).
72. Slade, supra note 68.
73. Id. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d
355 (1984); Galveston City Surf Bathing Co. v. Heidenheimer, 63 Tex. 559 (1885);
N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 146-6(f), 1-45.1, 113A-134.1 (1983
and Supp. 1988) (dry sand beach between the mean high tide line and the vegetation line traditionally used by the public).
U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988) [hereinafter "Phillips Petroleum"].
74. __
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the tide.7 5 Phillips Petroleum Company and the Cinque Bambini
Partnership held record title to the lands, tracing their claims back
to prestatehood Spanish land grants. The State of Mississippi issued oil and gas leases that included the disputed lands, claiming
that at time of statehood it acquired and held in public trust "all
land lying under any waters influenced by the tide, whether navi''
gable or not. 17
The United States Supreme Court first pointed to the "seminal case in American public trust jurisprudence

77

in which it had

concluded:
At common law, the title and dominion inlands flowed by the
tide water were in the King for the benefit of the nation ....
Upon the American Revolution, these rights, charged with a like
trust, were vested in the original States within their respective
borders, subject to7 8the rights surrendered by the Constitution of
the United States.

According to the Court, Shively was simply a reiteration of prior
decisions incorporating "similar, sweeping statements of States'
dominion over lands beneath tidal waters.

'79

Not only are the

rights of navigation reserved to the public in these waters, but also
fishing, 80 reclamation for urban expansion," and oyster planting
and harvesting. 82 The Court then reaffirmed its longstanding
precedents "which hold that the States, upon entry into the Union,
received ownership of all lands under waters subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide."83
Phillips Petroleum and Cinque Bambini Partnership argued
that the test for state ownership should be whether the waters over
the claimed lands were navigable in fact, and pointed to the fact
that in England, practically all navigable rivers are influenced by
the tide. Thus, they argued, the terms "tidewater" and "navigability" were synonymous at common law, and consequently, the
King's ownership of lands beneath tidewaters actually rested on
the navigability of those waters rather than the tidal ebb and
75. Id. at

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

-,

108 S. Ct. at 793.

Id.
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
Id. at 57.
Phillips Petroleum, - U.S. at
, 108 S. Ct. at 794.
Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855).
Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
Phillips Petroleum, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 795.
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flow.84 The Court declined to debate "what the English law was,''85
since it had "consistently interpreted the common law as providing
that the lands beneath waters under tidal influence were given
States upon their admission into the Union." 86 Although the Court
acknowledged that it had criticized the "ebb and flow" test in The
Genesee Chief,87 it stated that the settled law of this country was
recognized in Barney v. Keokuk: 8 lands under navigable freshwater lakes and rivers were within the reach of the public trust,
subject to the federal navigation easement and Congress' power to
control navigation under the Commerce Clause.8 9 However, the
Court stated:
That States own fresh water river bottoms as far as the rivers
are navigable.

..

does not indicate that navigability is or was the

prevailing test for state dominion over tidelands. Rather, this rule
represents the American decision to depart from what it understood to be the English rule limiting Crown ownership to the soil
under tidal waters.90
The Court pointed out that in Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v.
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.,91 it had stated that Barney v. Keokuk had "extended the doctrine to waters which were nontidal but
nevertheless navigable, consistent with [the Court's] earlier extension of admiralty jurisdiction.

' 92

The Genesee Chief and Barney v.

Keokuk extended admiralty jurisdiction and the public trust doctrine to navigable fresh waters and the lands beneath them, but
the Court did not read these decisions as "simultaneously withdrawing from public trust coverage those lands which had been
consistently recognized in [its] cases as being within [the] doctrine's scope: all lands beneath waters influenced by the ebb and
'
flow of the tide."93
Phillips Petroleum and the Cinque Bambini Partnership
weakened their argument by conceding that states own the tidelands bordering the oceans, bays, and estuaries, even where the wa84. Id. at

85.
86.
87.
88.

__,

108 S. Ct. at 796.

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
94 U.S. 324 (1876).

89. Phillips Petroleum, __ U.S. at
90. Id. at -,
108 S. Ct. at 797.

-,

108 S. Ct. at 796.

-,

108 S. Ct. at 797.

91. 429 U.S. 363 (1977).
92. Phillips Petroleum, __ U.S. at
93. Id. at -,
108 S. Ct. at 797.
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ters cannot be considered navigable. The Court stated:
It is obvious that these waters are part of the sea, and the lands
beneath them are State property; ultimately, though, the only
proof of this fact can be that the waters are influenced by the ebb
and flow of the tide. This is undoubtedly why the ebb-and-flow
test has been the measure of public ownership of tidelands for so
long."
The Court noted that all tide waters are connected to the sea, and
that although the lands in this case differed in some ways from
lands directly adjacent to the sea, they nonetheless shared the
" 'geographical, chemical and environmental' qualities that make
lands beneath tidal waters unique."5 The Court held that the

lands became the property of Mississippi at the time of its admission to the Union in 1817. Further, it declined to set aside the
Mississippi supreme court's state-law determination that subsequent developments had not divested the state of its ownership.96
Phillips Petroleum does not vitiate the "navigability" test. Instead, the thrust of the decision is that the public trust doctrine
casts its mantle over all submerged lands whose waters are subject
directly or indirectly to the ebb and flow of the tide, no matter how
far from the sea they may be. This rule is subject to the caveat
that the states are free to determine for themselves the extent to
which they will allow private encroachment on public trust lands.
E. Recurring Property Issues
Several issues exist which may universally arise to plague state
courts in their particular interpretation and application of the
public trust doctrine. The extent of public rights in tidelands varies from state to state.9 The property issues which courts may
have to resolve are: (1) What is the geographical boundary between
private and public trust land? (2) To what extent can the state
alienate public trust lands in fee? (3) What private and public uses
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., City of Newport Beach v. Fager, 39 Cal. App. 2d 23, 102 P.2d
438 (1940) (legislature may alienate tidelands from public trust if public interest
not substantially impaired); Orbrecht v. National Gypsum Co., 361 Mich. 399, 105
N.W.2d 143 (1960) (beds of Great Lakes alienable in exceptional circumstances);
State Land Bd. v. Heuker, 25 Or. App. 137, 548 P.2d 1323 (1976) (state cannot
grant away public right to use tidelands for commerce and navigation).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1989

19

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 2
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:23

are protected by the public trust doctrine? and (4) What public
rights are impressed upon owners whose property lies upland from
public trust tidelands? Additionally, the constitutional "takings"
issue may arise when a state attempts to regain ownership and
control of land previously considered to be privately held.
As stated earlier, traditionally, all lands covered by the sea,
including lands subject to the ebb and flow of the tides as well as
navigable nontidal waterways, are subject to the public trust doctrine. Although most states have established the high water mark
as the inland geographic boundary of public trust lands,98 a few
eastern-seaboard states extend private ownership of oceanfront
property to the low water line, subject to reserved rights of the
general public for navigation, commerce, and fishing. In some
states, these reserved public rights can be extinguished by lawful
wharfing or filling, provided it does not interfere with navigation. 99
Coastal tidelands are a constantly changing ecosystem with mobile
geographic boundaries. Wetlands are created and destroyed on a
regular basis, forcing states to deal with the question of the boundaries of trust lands with regard to accretion, reliction, and
avulsion. 00o
Furthermore, the reach of the public trust doctrine has expanded during the past two decades to include not only fishing,
navigation, and commerce, but also dry sand areas of private
beaches,' 0 ' nonnavigable tributary streams,"0 2 park land,""
98. See, e.g., Martin v. O'Brien, 34 Miss. 21 (1857).
99. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851). See infra note 229.
100. See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 324 So. 2d 746 (Miss.
1975). See also Slade, supra note 68, at 26.
Gradual and imperceptible changes in the shoreline produced solely by the
forces of nature (e.g. erosion, accretion, reliction) inure to the benefit or loss of
the upland owner. That is, the seaward boundary of the upland owner changes
with the naturally occuring gradual and imperceptible changes in the shoreline.
Sudden changes in the shoreline produced by natural forces (e.g. avulsion), however, do not act to change boundary lines. Changes in the shoreline due to man
induced forces (e.g. filling, piers, jetties) also do not act to change boundary lines.
The public's trust rights to the use of the "new" shoreland resulting from the
erosion, accretion or reliction remain unchanged. The public's trust rights to
shoreland within the boundaries of the upland owner due to avulsion, however,
remain unclear. The public's trust rights to use filled land, also is unclear, with
either variation between states' laws on the point, or no law.
101. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, Inc., 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d
355, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
102. National Audubon Soc'y., v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709,

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol12/iss1/2

20

Spalding: The Pearl in the Oyster: The Public Trust Doctrine in North Carol

1989]

PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

streambeds, 04 marine life, °5 sand and gravel in water beds,'0 6 an
historic battlefield,0 7 wildlife, 08 archeological remains, 09 and even
a downtown area. " In short, the geographic boundaries of the doctrine are sufficiently elastic to cover the lands that each particular
state court or legislature determines should be protected for its
citizens.
The United States Supreme Court has stated, however, that
the extent to which a state can alienate public trust lands in fee is
a matter of state law, in that a state's trust obligations do not prevent the alienation of public trust lands when the public interest is
enhanced or when the conveyance does not impair the public's use
of the remaining lands."' This is known as the "public purpose"
exception." 2 Perusal of the recent case law suggests that this test
would be hard to meet in most state courts."'
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
103. Sierra Club v. Dep't of Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974);
Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 46 Ill. 2d 330, 263 N.E.2d 11 (1970); Gould v.
Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
104. Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 211 Mont. 29,
684 P.2d 1088 (1984).
105. National Audubon Soc'y., supra note 102.
106. Warren Sand & Gravel Co. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Envtl. Resources,
20 Pa. Commw. 186, 341 A.2d 556 (1975).
107. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa.
193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973).
108. Wade v. Kramer, 121 Ill. App. 3d 377, 459 N.E.2d 1025 (1984).
109. Id..
110. Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Nat. Resources,
115 Wis. 2d 381, 340 N.W.2d 722 (1983). One state supreme court has determined
that the public trust doctrine applies to all natural resources, including air and
water, and therefore governs state agency decisions that implement state hazardous waste control legislation. Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control
Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152, (La. 1984). Other courts have refused to expand the
doctrine to an alley adjacent to a junkyard, Mamolella v. First Bank of Oak Park,
97 Ill. App. 3d 579, 423 N.E.2d 204 (1981), or to showers and bathhouses on the
seashore, Hyland v. Borough of Allenhurst, 148 N.J. Super. 437, 372 A.2d 1133
(1977), modified, 78 N.J. 190, 393 A.2d 579 (1978).
111. Illinois Central,supra note 57.
112. The factors considered by the courts in determining whether specific
grants fit within the public purpose exception are: (1) whether the lands are capable of serving any public purpose in their natural state; (2) whether the private
grantees will dedicate all or any portion of the land to actual public use; (3)
whether indirect public benefits, such as the promotion of commerce and navigation, will be derived from private use; and (4) whether the private grantees have
paid sufficient consideration. Kiefer, supra note 15.
113. See, e.g., People v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773
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With regard to private rights and public uses, at least one
court has held that the rights incidental to littoral ownership 114 include the privileges of landing boats, hauling nets, gathering seaweed and shells, and taking sand from the beach between the high
and low water marks."' The littoral owner may also build a wharf
or pier. " 6 If the submerged land has been declared subject to the
public trust doctrine, the public would retain its common law
rights to fish and navigate in the waters. The combination of these
private and public rights may create an uneasy tension in protected near-shore waters.
In the early 1970s, a national movement developed to reduce
the growing loss of coastal wetlands to the pressures of developers.
Congress responded by passing the Coastal Zone Management Act
of 1972,'17 which provides coastal states with incentives to manage
their coastal areas through implementation of federally approved
coastal zone management programs. Many states passed coastal
wetlands protection laws" 8 that impact littoral owners by requiring permits for certain activities. Although private littoral rights
are subordinate to public rights, the laws recognize and accommodate these rights by exempting some activities for littoral owners. 119 However, if a littoral owner's activity adversely affects tidelands, it will be subject to a review procedure. 2 0
Finally, littoral and riparian owners have often argued that
the enforcement of public trust rights constitutes a taking of private property for public use, which requires that just compensation
be paid. The issue cannot be decided by reference to the law of
(1971); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 383 Mass. 895, 424 N.E.2d 1092
(1981); International Paper v. Mississippi State Highway Dep't, 271 So. 2d 395
(Miss. 1972).
114. Littoral owners are those whose property borders on an ocean, sea, or
lake. Riparian owners are those whose land borders on a water course. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 842 (5th ed. 1979).
115. Barataria Canning Co. v. Ott, 84 Miss. 737, 37 So. 121 (1904).
116. See supra note 100, para. 1.
117. Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (1987).
118. See, e.g., Acme Fill Corp. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Dev.
Comm'n, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1056, 232 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1986); Exit Co. Partnership v.
Airlines Capital Corp., - Haw. App. -, 766 P.2d 129 (1988); MacGibbon v.
Bd. of Appeals of Duxbury, 369 Mass. 523, 344 N.E.2d 185 (1976); South Carolina
Coastal Council v. Vogel, 292 S.C. 449, 357 S.E.2d 187 (1987); Orion Corp. v.
State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987).
119. Id. and supra note 117.
120. Id.
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takings in general, since the scope of regulation of tidelands is distinct from land use regulation of dry lands. In the case of dry
lands, the state holds no property interest, so that the reach of the
police power does not extend beyond reasonable regulation for the
benefit of the general public. In the case of submerged lands, however, the state has a retained property interest for the benefit of
the public. Therefore, the state has merely increased its power to
mandate the public purposes which must be served by the use of
lands subject to the public trust without running afoul of the takings clause. 1 21 Accordingly, one may conclude that the public trust
doctrine reflects the assertion of public rights that preexist any
private property rights in lands or resources at issue. Logically,
then, such an assertion of rights cannot be deemed a taking of private property.
This conclusion is buttressed by the Phillips Petroleum deci1
sion. 22 The Court "recognized the importance of honoring reasonable expectations in property interests.' 1 23 But it noted that "such
expectations can only be of consequence where they are 'reasonable.' ",124 Since Mississippi law had consistently held that the public trust in submerged lands- included "title to all the land under
tidewater," the Court stated that this was "ample indication of the
State's claim to tidelands."'1 5 Mississippi's cases had also referred
to uses such as bathing, swimming, recreation, fishing, and mineral
development, which gave notice that the "State's claims were not
limited to lands under navigable waterways."' 26 The Court held
that any contrary expectations could not be considered reasonable. 2 A challenge grounded on a takings issue, then, would probably not survive in the face of state case law indicating a state's
claim to tidelands or any other property or resource protected by
28
the public trust doctrine.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. V (1984). See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987), oral arguments summarized in 25 ENVTL. REP. (Dec. 21,
1987).
122. See supra note 74.
123. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 798.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. The Phillips Petroleum dissenters (O'Connor, Stevens, and Scalia, JJ.)
were distressed that the Court's decision would break a chain of title reaching
back more than 150 years. The dissenters found "settled expectations" to exist
even in the absence of a state grant and in the face of many state and federal
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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NORTH CAROLINA

Historical Law

North Carolina has more than 2,200,000 acres of coastal
sounds, salt marshes, and broad river mouths.129 As one of the thirteen original states, 180 North Carolina was governed by the English
Lords Proprietor during its colonial period. 31 Naturally, the common law public trust doctrine was applied to ensure the free use of
the coastal waterways for public navigation, fishing, and commerce. 32 As early as 1711 and 1719, the first representative government ensured the continuity of the common law by enacting
laws which precluded any grant of exclusive rights in navigable waters or the lands beneath them. 3 Those rights under the public
trust doctrine have survived to the present day and are defined as
"the right to navigate, 'wim, hunt, fish, and enjoy all recreational
activities in the watercourses of the State." 3 "
An examination of the case law demonstrates that North Carolina held its shorelands at the time of the adoption of the United
States Constitution and continues to hold title in its trust capacity
to the beds of tidal waters, Whether the waters above such lands
are navigable or nonnavigable, including mudflats and other areas
exposed at low tide.
court decisions recognizing public trust rights in tidal waters. Id. at 804.
Note also that although the question of whether a state may be estopped
from asserting ownership of public trust lands because of earlier actions will usually be decided under state law, the United States Supreme Court could find that
the state action constituted a taking under Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164 (1978) (state's failure to act to assert ownership or control at an earlier
stage created property interests for which compensation must be made). See
Smith, Reclaiming the Public Trust (paper presented at the Seventh Annual
Submerged Lands Management Conference 1988).
129. Cauffman, Preserving the Public Trust vs. Private Submerged Land
Claims in North Carolina (unpublished research project, Aug. 1988).
130. New York, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, and Rhode Island. Brief amicus curiae of the Thirteen Original States
filed in support of Mississippi in Phillips Petroleum, supra note 74.
131. 1663-1728. Cauffman, supra note 129.
132. In a 1667 set of instructions for Albemarle County, the Lords Proprietor
declared that all residents should have "free passage through, or by any Seas,
Sounds, Creeks, Rivers, Riverlets, etc. in the said Providence of Carolina. Id. at 34 (quoting Saunders, I The Colonial Records of North Carolina at X (1886)).
133. Id. at 4.
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45.1 (1985). Cauffman, id.
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As discussed earlier in this article, the original test for lands
jus publicum was whether the waters above them were subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide.'"5 In Wilson v. Forbes,"' the North
Carolina Supreme Court determined that the ebb-and-flow test
was inapplicable to North Carolina because of the "great length of
[its] rivers, extending far into the interior, and the sand-bars and
other obstructions at their mouths." 3 7 The court substituted a test

more suitable to the state's topography:
[A] creek or river .... wide and deep enough for sea vessels

to navigate, and without any obstruction to this navigation from
its mouth to the ocean, and the limit of whose waters is not
higher nor as high as the flowing of the tides upon our sea coasts,
is a navigable stream within the general rule."3
This test was affirmed in Collins v. Benbury.'s9 There, plaintiff
brought an action to recover damages allegedly sustained as a result of defendant's interference with plaintiffs seine "whilst he was
enjoying his exclusive right of fishing in the waters of Albemarle
Sound."11 40 The court framed the issue in terms of whether plaintiff

was the owner of the submerged land over which he hauled his
fishing seine, by virtue of his ownership in the shore."4 It held that
plaintiff was not the owner (1) because the "common law forbade
the grant of property in land covered by a stream of water which in
that law was called navigable,""' (2) because North Carolina's
statutes similarly forbade "a grant of land covered by water ...
denominated navigable, '"I" and (3) because Albemarle Sound
"must certainly be deemed navigable in the sense of either the one
or the other of those laws, if not both of them." 4 ' The court
135. See Schoenbaum, Public Rights and Coastal Zone Management, 51
N.C.L. REV. 1 (1972); Earnhardt, Defining Navigable Waters and the Application
of the Public-Trust Doctrine in North Carolina: A History and Analysis, 49
N.C.L. REV. 888 (1971).

136. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 21 (1828).
137. Id. at 34. The court pointed out that if the English rule were strictly
followed, both Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds, which are inland seas, would not
be classified as navigable and would thus be subject to private ownership. Id.
138. Id. at 35.
139. 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 118 (1844).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 95.
142. Id. at 95-96.
143. Id. at 96.
144. Id.
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pointed out that no one could be entitled to the exclusive right of
fishing in any navigable water unless such right was derived from
an express grant by the sovereign power, or by such length and
type of possession as would cause a presumption of a grant to
arise. 1 5 Plaintiff had no exclusive rights to fish as he claimed, because in fishing the sound, he only exercised a right which belonged to him in common with the rest of the public.1 "
An interesting little case came before the supreme court in
1846. In Hatfield v. Grimstead,4

7

a $10.00 penalty against defend-

ant for hunting geese on plaintiff's land was at issue. Defendant's
argument was that plaintiff's claim of ownership to the Currituck
Inlet shoal on which the hunting blind defendant had used was
located was void under Laws 1715, Rev. Code, ch. 6, sec. 3 and
1777, ch. 114, sec. 10. These laws directed how land lying on navigable water could be entered and surveyed.148 The court stated
that since the inlet had been closed, the shoals were not fit for any
purpose except as hunting grounds for wild fowl; but whether the
land would have been subject to the laws was irrelevant, because
they had inadvertently been omitted from the Revised Statutes of
1836.149 The issue was therefore decided under the common law,

which permitted the land to be alienated by the sovereign because
it was not subject to the ebb and flow of the151tide after the inlet
had been closed. 150 Plaintiff's deed was valid.
In Ward v. Willis, 15 2 the charter of the Town of Beaufort ex-

pressly extended the town's boundaries to the low water mark on
Core Sound, thus vesting the land between the high and low water
marks in the town commissioners to convey in fee simple. Plaintiff
1 53
therefore claimed his property under a specific legislative grant.
Defendant also claimed it under an entry.5 5 The Supreme Court
discussed the English law and stated:
145. Id. at 94. This latter comment appeared in defendant's argument in
State v. Credle, see text accompanying notes 222 and 223 infra.
146. Id.
147. 29 N.C. 103, 7 Ired. 139 (1846).
148. Id. at 104.
149. Id. at 105. They were later reenacted.
150. Id. at 104. Before the inlet was closed, boats could pass at high tide, but
it had become much shallower since and therefore was n6t subject to the "navigable by sea vessel" test.
151. Id. at 105.
152. 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 183 (1858).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 184.
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It seems, thus, to be clear, that whatever soil is at any time
covered by a navigable water in its natural state is deemed to be
in the same state as if it were in the bed of the water; in other
words, that it is all one, whether it be under the channel or be the
margin between the high and low water lines.18 '
The court concluded:
The same public purposes require that, here, as in England,
the State should reserve lands in that situation from private appropriation; and although it may please the Legilature [sic] to
dispose of them by special grant for the promotion of trade and
the growth of a commercial town, accessible to vessels, it rationally accounts for the restriction upon the common mode of granting other public land ....

156

Ward v. Willis makes two important points: first, the public
trust in submerged lands extends to the line of ordinary high
water, and second, the legislature may grant such land to private
157
ownership where a sufficient public purpose exists.
In 1857, Tyre Glen built a milldam across the Yadkin River,
from bank to bank, in order to supply his grist and sawmills with
water; but as a result, shad and other fish were prevented from
passing up the channel of the river above the dam."' Glen owned
the bed of the river at the time he erected the milldam under a
1794 grant from the state, as well as the land on both sides of the
river under earlier grants from the state. " ' Chapter 244 of the
Laws of 1858 directed that the Yadkin River was to be kept open
for the passage of fish and that anyone failing to remove obstructions from the watercourse would be subject to a fine of $15.00.1
Glen was indicted under this statute. The case gave the North Carolina Supreme Court a chance to review its prior decisions and to
reaffirm its recognition of the classification of the waters in this
state.
The court framed the issue in terms of whether the legislature
had the power under the North Carolina and Federal Constitutions
to force Glen to take part of his dam away to make passage for fish
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 185.
Id. at 185-86.
See supra note 112.
State v. Glen, 52 N.C. 248, 7 Jones 321 (1859).
Id. at 249.
Id.
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at his own expense without indemnification.161 The court first undertook to ascertain the nature of the river at the point where Glen
had erected the milldam. In its review of the English common
law, 2 the court stated the general rule that
[a]ll rivers above the flow of tidewater are, by the common
law, prima facie private; but when they are naturally of sufficient
depth for valuable flotage, the public have an easement therein

for the purposes of transportation and commercial intercourse;
and, in fact, they are public highways by water. [T]hey are called
public rivers, not in reference to the property of the river, for
who own the land, but in reference only
that is in the individuals
16
to the public use.

-

The court concluded that the Yadkin River was not a navigable
stream at the milldam location, since it was not navigable by sea
vessels; and further, the existence of a public easement in it was
doubtful, since only on a few occasions in the past twenty years
had commodities been carried down it in "flats.""1 4 Moreover, Glen
was much more than a riparian owner because he claimed the
riverbed under a direct state grant. The court held that the state
could not take Glen's property from him or materially impair its
161. Id. at 250.
162. For this purpose, the court went "to the highest authority on the subject, Lord Hale's treatise [D]e [J/ure [Miaris et [Bjrachiorum [E]jusdem":
There may be some streams or rivers that are private, not only in
propriety or ownership, but also in use, as little streams or rivers that are
not a common passage for the King's people. Again, there be other rivers, as well fresh as salt, that are of common or public use for carriage of
boats and lighters, and these, whether they are fresh or salt, whether
they flow and reflow or not, are prima facie publici juris, common highways for a man or goods, or both, from one inland town to another.
Id. at 250 (quoting De Jure Maris et Brachiorum Ejusdem, (Hargrave translation
at 809)) (emphasis in original). The court also noted:
Fresh rivers, of what kind soever, do of common right belong to the
owners of the soil adjacent, so that the owners of one side have, of common rights, the propriety of the soil, and consequently the right of fishing usque ad filum aquae, and owners of the other side the right of soil
or ownership and fishing unto the filum aquae on their side; and if a man
be owner of the land on both sides, in common presumption, he is the
owner of the whole river, and hath the right of fishing according to the
extent of his land in length. With this agrees the common experience.
Id. at 251 (quoting Hargrave at 5).
163. Id. (quoting Angell, Watercourses § 535 (1877)) (emphasis in original).
164. Id. at 252.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol12/iss1/2
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value without compensating him. 65 The statute was therefore repugnant to both Constitutions. 166
The court then took this opportunity to summarize "the law of
North Carolina in relation to the watercourses of the State":
1. All the bays and inlets on our coast, where the tide from
the sea ebbs and flows, and all other waters, whether sounds, rivers, or creeks, which can be navigated by sea vessels, are called
navigable, in a technical sense, are altogether publici juris, and
the soil under them cannot be entered and a grant taken for it
under the entry law. In them, too, the right of fishing is free.
Where the tide ebbs and flows, the shore, between the high
and low water, is also within the prohibition of private appropriation, under the general entry law, but may be the subject of a
direct, special legislative grant.
2. All the rivers, creeks, and other watercourses not embraced
in the above description, but which are, in fact, sufficiently wide
and deep to be navigable by boats, flats and rafts, are technically
styled unnavigable, and are open to be appropriated by individuals, by grants from the State, under the entry laws. When the bed
of the watercourse is not included in the grant, but the stream is
called for as one of the boundaries, the grantee is entitled as an
incidental easement, to go to the middle of the stream, and may
exercise and enjoy that easement for the purpose of catching fish,
or in any other manner not incompatible with the right which the
public have in the stream, for water communication, between different points on it ....
[T]he Legislature may, perhaps, resume
the incidental rights, for the public use, without making compen165. Id. at 253. "It is established by the greatest weight of authority that [the
state] cannot [take property given under a state grant] for any other than a public
purpose, either with or without compensation." Id. See also Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 177 S.E.2d 513 (1970)
(fishing pier operator whose seashore lots had been completely eroded by Atlantic
Ocean not entitled to compensation from municipality on theory that latter's construction of beach erosion seawall constituted a taking, where ocean's erosive action had effectively divested operator of title prior to seawall construction and
had vested title in municipality); Dodge v. State Highway Comm'n, 221 N.C. 4, 18
S.E.2d 706 (1942) (petitioner could not recover compensation where State Highway Commission constructed canal bridge under which petitioner could not float
his barge). But see Shelby v. Power Co., 155 N.C. 160, 71 S.E. 218 (1911) (state
cannot divest itself of right to exercise police power for the general good; prescription cannot run against public rights).
166. State v. Glen, 52 N.C. at 258. See State v. Forehand, 67 N.C. App. 148,
312 S.E.2d 247 (1984) (condemnation proceeding; since statehood, North Carolina
policy has leaned towards a prohibition on the sale in fee simple of state lands
under navigable waters).
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sation for them ....
3. All the rivulets, brooks, and other streams which... cannot be used for intercommunication for inland navigation are entirely the subjects of private ownership .... Rights acquired in
streams of this class by grants from the State, or, in watercourses
of the second class, cannot be taken from the owners by the Government except in the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
and then only for public use, with a provision for . . . just
167
compensation.

In short, the Glen court recognized two classes of waters: public
trust beds and private beds. The public trust ownership of the bed
extends both to all lands subject to the ebb and flow of the tides to
the farthest influx of salt water and to all waters navigable by sea
vessels. 168

In the years that followed, a line of cases reaffirmed and refined the law set forth in Glen.16 9 The first harbinger of the issues
167. State v. Glen, 52 N.C. at 257-58 (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
168. See Collins v. Benbury, 25.N.C. (3 Ired.) 277 (1842); Ingram v. Threadgill, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) 59 (1831); Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 30 (1828). For
the law in the other original states, see generally Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, brief amicus curiae of the Thirteen Original States, joined by the Coastal
States Organization (Oct. Term, 1986).
169. 52 N.C. 371. In Skinner v. Hettrick, 73 N.C. 53 (1875), the court held
that since Albemarle Sound was a navigable water, it was not subject to entry
although every citizen had fishing. privileges in the waters. Therefore, while a
beach owner could draw his seine to the beach to the exclusion of others, he could
not acquire the sole right of fishing in the waters of the sound because to constitute a several fishery there must be a right of soil. Such right could not be had in
Albemarle Sound. The court also pointed out that regulation of the right to fish in
navigable waters is a proper subject of legislation. See also Bell v. Smith, 171 N.C.
116, 87 S.E. 987 (1916) (grant of land bordering upon or partly under navigable
waters cannot confer upon the grantee sole or exclusive right of fishing in such
waters).
In Bond v. Wool, 107 N.C. 126, 12 S.E. 281 (1890), the court held that persons owning lands on navigable streams may erect wharves next to their lands up
to deep water but are confined to straight lines out from their waterfronts. Defendant was therefore not a trespasser since, in order to gain access to deep water,
he had erected a pier on his own natural waterfront even though it stood between
plaintiff's fish-houses and deep water. Plaintiff was only entitled to access to deep
water at his immediate waterfront.
In Capune v. Robbins, 273 N.C. 581, 160 S.E.2d 881 (1968), the court noted
that Congress had relinquished to the states the entire interest of the United
States in all lands beneath navigable waters within state boundaries, inclusive of
submerged lands within three geographical miles seaward from the coast of each
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol12/iss1/2
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facing the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Credle in
1988 appeared in 1894. In State v. Spencer,170 a case from Hyde
County, defendant was alleged to have made entry under a stategranted franchise to take oysters from a natural oyster bed in
Pamlico Sound rather than a cultivated one, as the applicable statstate. In Robbins, the court held that although a littoral owner has the right to
construct a pier in order to provide access to ocean waters of greater depth, he
may not lawfully prohibit the use of the ocean waters beneath the pier as a passage to water craft, nor may he obstruct the rights of the public to use the ocean
waters seaward from the strip of land constituting the foreshore.
In Commissioners v. Lumber Co., 116 N.C. 420, 21 S.E. 941 (1895), floatable
rivers were deemed navigable highways, in which the public has an easement paramount to the rights of riparian owners. The court held that in order to establish
such an easement, it is unnecessary to show that the watercourse is susceptible of
use continuously during the whole year. One need only show that the water will
rise and remain at such height as to make it profitable as a highway for transporting logs to mills or markets lower down the watercourse. And in State v. Twiford,
136 N.C. 603, 48 S.E. 586 (1904), the court reiterated that where a stream is navigable in fact, it is navigable in law. The test is whether the stream is capable of
being used for trade and travel, rather than the extent and manner of such use.
An important rule was laid down in Shepard's Point Land Co. v. Atlantic
Hotel, 132 N.C. 366, 44 S.E. 39 (1903). There, the court held that a grant to a
riparian owner of land covered by navigable water conveys only an easement
therein, and a deed of the land adjoining the navigable water conveys the easement in the land covered by the water. The court stated that "[t]he policy of the
State from 1777 until 1854 was ... to preserve its title to the navigable waters, as
the same had been held by the King of England, in trust for the free use of all of
its citizens." Id. at 376, 44 S.E. at 44. The court could not agree that this policy
was to be reversed so that the growth of a prospective seaport was to be hampered
by the grant of the entire waterfront to private owners. Id. at 377, 44 S.E. at 44.
See also, State v. Twiford, 136 N.C. 438, 48 S.E. 586 (where the court held that
control of navigable water belongs to the public and is not appurtenant to ownership of the shore).
In Home Real Estate Loan & Ins. Co. v. Parmele, 214 N.C. 63, 197 S.E. 714
(1938), the court held that the State Board of Education, as successor to the Literary Fund of North Carolina is vested with title to all public lands, including
marshlands, which were owned by the fund at the time of adoption of article IX,
section 10 of the North Carolina Constitution. The board had sold large tracts of
land in order to fund the public school system. Since the marshlands were not
navigable, the State Board of Education could sell and convey the fee in any
marshland tract of more than two thousand acres. See also Parmele v. Eaton, 240
N.C. 539, 83 S.E.2d 93 (1954) (same); Resort Dev. Co. v. Parmele, 235 N.C. 689,
71 S.E.2d 474 (1952) (same). In 1953, the General Assembly passed a local public
act which provides that all marshlands and swamplands conveyed or granted by
the State Board of Education for New Hanover, Pender, and Onslow Counties are
valid. 1953 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 966, § 1.
170. 114 N.C. 473, 19 S.E. 93 (1894).
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ute provided. The case is notable for its detailed discussion of
chapter 119 of the Laws of 1887,' which set up an elaborate system to encourage oyster culture, as well as to preserve public rights
in the use of natural oyster beds in the sound. Under the statute,
entry "might be made of any ground which had not been designated as public ground, and after payment therefor, grants were to
issue, to the enterer, of a perpetual franchise to cultivate oysters
within a certain limit and upon a certain condition." '7 2 The court
concluded that no cause of action had been stated against defendant, because if the grant had been issued under the provisions of
and in strict accordance with the statute, "rights of property [had]
been acquired which the state itself [could not] take away, except
73
after compensation and under the principle of eminent domain.'
In State v. Sermons' 7 " defendant had sold oysters without a

license to persons in Swan Quarter, Hyde County. He had obtained
the oysters from a privately owned oyster bed known as Judith
Narrows which had been granted out by the state twenty years
previously. The case is interesting for its origin and for the court's
statement that fish, including oysters and other shellfish, are a
valid source of food supply which come within the police power of
the state and are therefore subject to the rules and regulations reasonably designed to protect them and to promote their increase
and growth.17 1 Such rules and regulations may not be set aside and
ignored simply because they indirectly affect private rights that
would ordinarily be* recognized. 76 And in Bell v. Smith, 7 the
court held that the exclusive right to fish in navigable waters could
not be acquired by prescriptive use.

78

B. Modern Reaffirmation-State v. Credle
In 1919, Sidney Arthur Credle

79 and

his father began to plant,

171. The statute makes a reappearance in State v. Credle.
172. State v. Spencer, 114 N.C. at 475, 19 S.E. at 95.
173. Id. at 476-77, 19 S.E. at 95.
174. 169 N.C. 344, 84 S.E. 337 (1915).
175. Id. at 346, 84 S.E. at 338.
176. Id.
177. 171 N.C. 116, 87 S.E. 987 (1916).
178. Id. at 118. This issue reappeared in State v. Credle in an ingeniously
crafted argument to both the court of appeals and the supreme court. See Defendant Appellant's Brief to the Court of Appeals at 7 and Defendant Appellant's
New Brief to the Supreme Court at 6.
179. Pronounced "Cradle".
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol12/iss1/2
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cultivate, and harvest oysters in a forty-acre tract of land submerged under the waters of Swan Quarter Bay in Hyde County. 80
These waters are part of Pamlico Sound and are affected by the
ebb and flow of the tide and the influx of salt water.' 8 ' Credle's
father, A.C. Credle, purchased the submerged land in 1918 and
1919 and placed posts, pilings, and railroad irons near or at the
corners of the oyster bed to mark the property.1 82 A.C. Credle
deeded the property to Credle in 1972. Both men paid taxes on the
oyster bed from the date of its purchase. Over the years, they
planted thousands of bushels of oysters on the submerged property.' 8 Credle, however, dredged for the oysters without a permit,14 prompting the state to initiate criminal proceedings against
him. Because Credle produced a compilation of old land grants
purportedly showing his predecessors in title, the local district attorney was persuaded to stipulate to Credle's ownership of the oyster bed. 185 Credle won his case. 186
The state then brought an action to quiet title against Credle
in 1982.187 In his answer, Credle asserted that he owned the land,
180. Petition for Discretionary Review to the North Carolina Supreme Court
at 2 (filed Sep. 4, 1987).
181. Pamlico Bay is a navigable body of water. State ex rel. Blount v. Spencer, 114 N.C. 779, 19 S.E. 93 (1894). See also map of Swan Quarter, North Carolina (United States Department of the Interior Geological Survey 1974).
182. Id. See also Cauffman, supra note 129, at 20-21.
183. Id.
184. Only the tonging method is permitted in this area. Interview with Geo.
Thomas Davis, Jr., Credle's attorney (Mar. 25, 1989).
185. The district attorney apparently did so without making a title check.
See Cauffman, supra note 129, at 21.
186. State v. Credle, Superior Court, Hyde County, 82CVS23 (Oct. 26, 1984).
187. State ex rel. Rohrer v. Credle, 86 N.C. App. 633, 634, 359 S.E. 2d. 45, 46
(1987). The state began its program of reclamation of submerged public trust
lands in 1965 with passage of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-205, which requires all persons who claim ownership of submerged lands beneath navigable waters in the
twenty-five coastal counties to register their claims with the Secretary of the
North Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Community Development.
The coastal counties include Beaufort, Bertie, Bladen, Brunswick, Camden, Carteret, Chowan, Columbus, Craven, Currituck, Dare, Gates, Halifax, Hertford,
Hyde, Martin, New Hanover, Northampton, Onslow, Pamlico, Pasquotank,
Pender, Perquimans, Tyrrell, and Washington. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-205(a)
(1987). All claims were to be registered on or before January 1, 1970. Id. Claimants were required to provide:
(1) a source instrument, issued: (a) by the sovereign, i.e., the King of
England, the Lords Proprietor, or the State, (b) under valid statutory
authority, and (c) specifically describing the claimed area; and (2) an unPublished by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1989
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"either by grant or adverse possession, and in any event, owned
the exclusive right to take oysters from it by prescriptive use.' 8 8
Credle's ownership claims were based on
(1) two deeds to his father, [A.C. Credle,] one from S.S.
Mann and the other from Zeb Hayes, which purported to convey
portions of a 640-acre grant that the State had made to one Joseph Hancock in 1786, (2) a perpetual franchise to take oysters
from ten described acres that the State had granted to one J.W.
Hayes in 1889 and (3) an application filed in 1891 by S.S. Mann
for a perpetual franchise to cultivate shellfish in 640 described

acres. 189
Credle's claim to prescriptive use was grounded on the assertion
that he and his father possessed the land and had been harvesting
oysters from the bottom under a claim of right continously from
1917.1'0
In superior court, the claim relying on the 1786 land grant to
Joseph Hancock was dismissed because Credle had failed to answer interrogatories concerning that particular chain of title. The
state was then granted a partial summary judgment which dismissed Credle's claims that he owned the land by adverse use or
prescriptive use. The trial court concluded that the exclusive right
to harvest oysters from the state's submerged lands could not be
acquired by prescriptive use.' 9 1 In May 1986, the state was granted
final summary judgment. The trial court ruled as a matter of law
that (1) Credle admitted that he could not bring his chain of title
forward from the 1889 Hayes franchise, 9 ' and (2) he could not
broken chain of title between the source instrument and the claimant's
title by: (a) an attorney's abstract, and/or (b) a copy of each deed, will or
other document showing each link in the chain of title; and (3) a map
illustrating the claimed area.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-205(a) (1987). More than ten thousand claims were registered, claiming ownership of 70% of the estuarine area along the southern half of
the North Carolina coast. See Cauffman, supra note 129, at 17. The Division of
Marine Fisheries is responsible for resolving the claims by December 31, 1990 (the
twenty-one-year adverse possession period). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-206(f) (1987).
188. State ex rel. Rohrer v. Credle, 86 N.C. App. 633, 634, 359 S.E.2d 45, 46
(1987).
189. State ex rel Rohrer v. Credle, 322 N.C. 522, 523-24, 369 S.E.2d 825, 826
(1988).
190. Id. at 524, 369 S.E.2d at 826.
191. Id.
192. Id. This franchise had a break in the chain of title between the original
grantee from the state, J.W. Hayes and Zeb Hayes, who sold the property to A.C.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol12/iss1/2
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prove that the state had issued a perpetual franchise from the 1891
Mann franchise application. " Credle had therefore failed to rebut
the presumption of title in the state under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14619 4
79. The state was declared the owner of the submerged land.
Credle appealed.
In the court of appeals, Credle expressly abandoned "all his
assignments of error except those relating to the claim that he
[had] acquired by prescriptive use the exclusive right to take shellfish from the submerged lands involved."195 Under the doctrine of
the law of the case, therefore, Credle did not own the lands, either
by grant or adverse possession, and had no exclusive right to take
shellfish from them under a franchise.196 The court of appeals
framed the issue as, "Can the exclusive right to take oysters from
lands under navigable waters in this State be acquired by prescriptive use?" 19 The court held that it could not. Relying on the cases
previously discussed in part two of this article, the court stated:
Lands under navigable waters can neither be appropriated by
private persons nor conveyed to them by the State except for a
public purpose when authorized by statute; and that . . . such
lands and the waters above them are held in trust for the use and
benefit of all our people, each of whom, subject to reasonable legislative regulation in the public interest, has a right to navigate,
fish and carry on commerce in such waters as he sees fit...
[G]rants of such lands not so authorized have been adjudged not
to convey title, but only an easement; .

.

. and it has been held

that there can be no exclusive right to fish in navigable
streams. 98

The court of appeals went on to discuss the theory on which
Credle based his claim of prescription-the common law right of
piscary, which is the right to fish in another man's waters. 99 AlCredle. Furthermore, the property description plots the land in the area of Far
Creek, which is twenty-five miles from Swan Quarter Bay. See Cauffman, supra
note 129, at 23.
193. 322 N.C. at 524, 369 S.E.2d at 826.
194. Id.
195. State ex rel. Rohrer v. Credle, 86 N.C. App. at 635, 359 S.E.2d at 46.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. (citing Shepard's Point Land Co. v. Atlantic Hotel, 132 N.C. 517, 44
S.E. 39 (1903); Skinner v. Hettrick, 73 N.C. 53 (1875); to Ward v. Willis, 51 N.C.
183 (1858)).
199. Id.
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though Credle acknowledged that North Carolina cases 00 state
that, as a general rule, no exclusive right to fish in the waters of
the state exists, he argued that the crucial difference in his case
was the fact that he was cultivating and harvesting oysters, not fin
fish. 20 1 He contended that "[t]he difference between the locomotive

powers of swimming fish and shellfish, such as oysters and clams,
20 2

justifie[d] the law in making a distinction as to their ownership.

The court of appeals described this argument as "interesting and
ingenious" but determined that it did not support a claim of exclusive right because profits a prendre, such as the right of piscary,
are not exclusive to the holder and because exclusive fishing rights
can only be acquired either by a grant of the soil under the water
or by a grant of fishing distinct from the soil. Under the law of the
case, Credle had neither.20 3
Credle then petitioned the North Carolina Supreme Court for
discretionary review, which was allowed. 0 4 At the supreme court,
Credle pointed out that he was asking the court "to hold that he
[had] the right to a trial to determine whether he [had] a prescriptive profit a prendre (or other similar right) to take oysters from
the oyster bottoms he and his father [had] cultivated for nearly 70
years.

' 20 5

Since the state could grant exclusive rights of fishery,

Credle argued that he should be able to acquire through prescription what he could acquire through grant, even though, in his case,
his chain of title had been adjudged as broken.206 Credle himself
did not concede that his chain of title was imperfect; rather, he
200. Bell v. Smith, 171 N.C. 116 (1916), and Daniels v. Homer, 139 N.C. 219

(1905).
201. Defendant Appellant's brief to the Court of Appeals at 5-6.
202. Id. (quoting 35 AM. JUR. 2d, Fish and Game § 5 (1967)). Credle argued:

Fin fish do not lend themselves to cultivation as do oysters and
clams. Fin fish can swim about anywhere. Any method that can be devised to keep them penned in would be a hinderance [sic] to navigation
and other customary uses of the open water. Oysters do not move about
of [sic] their own power to any appreciable extent; they do not need pens
to keep them contained. It is feasible to raise oysters and at the same
time keep the waters above the bottom open to the public for fin fishing,
navigation and other customary uses; whereas, it is not feasible to cultivate fin fish without substantial imposition on the free enjoyment of navigable waters by the general public.

Id.
203.
204.
205.
206.

State v. Credle, 86 N.C. App. at 636, 359 S.E.2d at 47.
321 N.C. 300, 363 S.E.2d 183 (1987).
Defendant Appellant's New Brief at 3-4.
Id. at 5.
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used the trial court's conclusion that it was to argue that, because
some of the records in the Hyde County Register of Deeds Office
had been removed or destroyed, his case for acquisition by pre0
scription was stronger.

7

The supreme court first briefly traced the emergence of the
public trust doctrine in England and its development in this country. 08 The court then turned to North Carolina, acknowledging
that it had recognized the public trust doctrine in Land Co. v.
Hotel20 9 and other cases. 210 The court pointed out that "[o]ne of
207. Id. The doctrine of prescription rests on the legalcfiction of a "lost
grant." HETRICK, WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA § 318 (rev. ed.

1981).
Credle's lawyer demonstrated a sense of humor by adding the following to the
conclusion of his brief to the supreme court.
"The time has come", the Walrus said,
"To talk of many things:
Of shoes-and ships-and sealing waxOf cabbages-and kingsAnd why the sea is boiling hot
And whether pigs have wings."
"But wait a bit", the Oysters cried,
"Before we have our chat;
For some of us are out of breath,
And all of us are fat!"
"No hurry", said the Carpenter.
They thanked him much for that.
"A loaf of bread", the Walrus said,
"Is what we chiefly need:
Pepper and vinegar besides
Are very good indeedNow, if you're ready, Oysters dear,
We can begin to feed."
"But not on us!", the Oysters cried,
Turning a little blue.
"After such kindness, that would be
A dismal thing to do!"
"The night is fine," the Walrus said.
"Do you admire the view?"
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass. Defendant Appellant's New Brief at 8.
208. Citing to Phillips Pet. Co. v. Mississippi & Saga Pet.
U.S.-, 108
S. Ct. 791 (1988); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1877); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
209. 132 N.C. 517, 44 S.E. 39 (1903).
210. Resort Dev. Co. v. Parmele, 235 N.C. 689, 71 S.E.2d 474 (1952); State v.
Spencer, 114 N.C. 770, 19 S.E. 93 (1894); Ward v. Willis, 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 183

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1989

37

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 2
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:23

the exceptions to the rule that the benefit and enjoyment of North
Carolina's submerged lands is available to all its citizens, subject to
reasonable legislative regulation, for navigation, fishing and commerce, relates specifically to shellfish."21 ' The exception was to be
found in "a series of statutes designed to encourage the cultivation
of oysters, while at the same time providing that natural oyster
beds were not subject to exclusive entry." ' In 1887, the legislature
adopted an act to promote shellfish cultivation in North Carolina,
which consisted of a system to grant perpetual franchises2 " upon
application and issuance of a certificate from the engineer of the
commissioners of shell fisheries as to the area, limits, and location
of the proposed oyster bed.2"4 The act specifically provided that no
franchise could be issued for shellfish cultivation in "any of the
public grounds."2" However, in 1909, the legislature passed another act specifically "to promote the cultivation of the oyster in
North Carolina."2 ' This statute instituted a system of renewable
leases.21 It also repealed the act of 1887. The court then reviewed
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-205-06 which were enacted in 1965 "in an

effort to clear title to lands claimed under perpetual franchises or
rights of fishery pursuant to the 1887 Act." ' The court noted that
under the statute, public ownership of submerged lands and public
trust rights are to be favored.2"9 Finally, the court pointed out that
article IX, section 5 of the North Carolina Constitution "mandates
(1858); Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 30 (1828).

211. State v. Credle, 322 N.C. at 527, 369 S.E.2d at 828. At this point, the
court began to construct Credle's argument for him.
212. Id. at 528, 369 S.E.2d at 828.
213. 1887 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 119, sec. 6. These franchises remained in the
grantee, his heirs, and legal representatives.
214. 322 N.C. at 528-29, 369 S.E.2d at 829.
215. 1887 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 119, §§ 5, 6.
216. 1909 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 871. State v. Credle, 322 N.C. at 529, 369
S.E.2d at 829.
217. See 1909 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 871., It remains in force today. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 113-202(a) (1987). See also In re Protest of Mason, 78 N.C. App. 16,
377 S.E.2d 99 (1985) (discussing requirement of shellfish cultivation lease);
Oglesby v. McCoy, 41 N.C. App. 735, 255 S.E.2d 773 (1979)
218. 322 N.C. at 531, 369 S.E.2d at 830; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-205-06
(1965). The statute provides that in any proceeding where title is contested, the
burden of showing title or right of fishery, by the preponderance of the evidence,
is on the claiming title or right holder. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-206(d) (1987). See
supra note 187 for a detailed explanation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-205.
219. State v. Credle, 322 N.C. at 532, 369 S.E.2d at 830; N.C. GEN. STAT. §
113-206(f) (1987).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol12/iss1/2
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the conservation and protection
of public lands and waters for the
220
benefit of the public.

Having marshalled its authorities, the court turned to Credle's
prescription argument, which was based on the contention that the
S.S. Mann franchise application submitted under the 1887 shellfish
cultivation act must have resulted in the issuance of a perpetual
franchise.221 Although he could not produce a copy of the
franchise,222 Credle had an affidavit from the Register of Deeds of
Hyde County stating that two deed books were missing. Thus,
Credle invited the court "to indulge in the legal fiction of the 'lost
grant' to divest the State of its title.

'22

The court declined this

invitation, mainly because the opposing party in this case was the
state, which enjoys a presumption of title under N.C. GEN. STAT. §
146-79.224

In addition, the public trust doctrine and the statutory

mandate favoring public trust ownership of submerged lands under
220. 322 N.C. at 532, 369 S.E.2d at 831. Article IX, section 5 of the North
Carolina Constitution provides:
It shall be the policy of this State to conserve and protect its lands
and waters for the benefit of all its citizenry, and to this end it shall be a
proper function of the State of North Carolina and its political subdivisions to acquire and preserve park, recreational, and scenic areas, to control and limit the pollution of our air and water, to control excessive
noise, and in every other way to preserve as a part of the common heritage of this State its forests, wetlands, estuaries, beaches, historical sites,
open-lands, and places of beauty.
N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (amend. 1972).
221. 322 N.C. at 533, 369 S.E.2d at 831.
222. Credle himself apparently located the original in the State Archives in
Raleigh but neglected to copy it and could not later relocate it. Interview with
Geo. Thomas Davis, Jr., attorney for Credle, (Mar. 25, 1989). This statement is in
apparent conflict with the Court's comment, See id.
223. Id. The affidavit from the Register of Deeds of Hyde County stated that
one deed book had been stolen many years previously and the other had been
burnt. Inquiry at the Hyde County Courthouse elicited the information that in
years past the Register of Deeds was accustomed to taking both deeds and deed
books home with him at night. He would then transcribe the information from
the deeds into the deed books. One night, his stove overturned, and in the ensuing
fire, deeds and books were destroyed. Interview at Hyde County Courthouse,
(Mar. 25, 1989).
224. Id.; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 146-79 (1983) quoted in State ex rel Rohrer v.
Credle. Such title can only be defeated by the opposing party's showing of a
"good and valid title to such lands in himself." 322 N.C. at 533, 369 S.E.2d at 831.
Credle's failure either to link himself to the 1889 Hayes franchise or to produce a
franchise issued to S.S. Mann scarcely enabled him to show "good and valid" title
against the State.
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N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-206(f) weighed against Credle.22 5
Finally, the court turned to an eighty-five-year-old case to
make its point: "Navigable waters are free. They cannot be sold or
monopolized. They can belong to no one but the public and are
reserved for free and unrestricted use by the public for all time.
Whatever monopoly may obtain on land, the waters are unbridled
'
yet."226
The court concluded that "[h]istory and the law bestow[ed] the title of these submerged lands and their oysters upon
the State to hold in trust for the people so that all [might] enjoy
227
their beauty and bounty.

Although Credle was "not entitled to a jury trial on the issue
of whether he had acquired the exclusive right to harvest oysters
by prescription" 22 8 in Swan Quarter Bay, he was nevertheless not
precluded from harvesting activities. He would simply have to
share the right to harvest oysters with the public.

C.

22 9

Resolvable Property Issues

The State v. Credle decision sheds light on several of the issues discussed in part one of this article. First, what is the geographical boundary between private and public trust lands in
North Carolina? Under the State v. Credle decision, with its
strong reaffirmation of the traditional public trust doctrine, title to
225. Id. at 534, 369 S.E.2d at 832.
226. Id. (quoting State v. Twiford, 136 N.C. 603, 609, 48 S.E. 586, 588
(1904)).
227. Id. The early controversies leading to the adoption of the public trust
doctrine in this country were also based on the right to use oyster beds. Arnold v.
Mundy, 6 N.J.L. (1 Hal.) 1 (1821). Oyster beds constitute breeding grounds and a
source of food for innumerable species, both aquatic and amphibious. They also
protect adjacent water by acting as filters. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7,
201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
228. Id. at 534-35, 369 S.E.2d at 832.
229. Id. Credle himself has not taken an oyster from Swan Quarter Bay since
State v. Credle was decided. He is an elderly gentleman and has partially lost the
use of his hands. In addition, he maintains that the water is too deep for harvesting by the tonging method, and dredging is not permitted in the area. Interview
with Geo. Thomas Davis, Jr. (Mar. 25, 1988).
Two weeks after the decision was filed on 30 June 1988, a spate of newspaper
articles appeared. See N.C. Court Severely Limits Claims to Submerged Lands,
Raleigh News and Observer, July 15, 1988, at IA and 6A, col. 1; Shellfish Harvesters Preparing to Fight for River Bottoms, Raleigh News and Observer, July 18,
1988, at 1C, col. 1; Submerged Lands Ruling Significant, State Official Says, Raleigh News and Observer, Oct. 6, 1988, at IC, col. 1.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol12/iss1/2
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all submerged lands subject to the ebb and flow of the lunar tides,
as well as those covered by watercourses navigable by sea vessels
and those which meet the "flotability" test, is vested in the state to
hold in trust for the people. The seashore boundary is still the
mean high water mark. 230 Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-205, the

state lays claim only to lands that still lay under navigable waters
in 1965. Lands that lay beneath navigable waters at the time of
statehood but were subsequently filled and raised above the mean
high water mark pursuant to a state grant or permit would not be
open to an assertion of public trust rights. The resolution process
under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-205 will probably result in the invalidation of many state grants and the impression on privately owned
lands of the traditional public trust easement for navigation, commerce, and fishing. 1 The state will recognize the Board of Education deeds to coastal marshlands as valid, 23
but
it may attempt to
2
impress them with a public trust easement.
Second, to what extent can the state alienate public trust
lands in fee? In State v. Credle, the supreme court held that
grants of fee simple title issued by the state to lands submerged by
navigable waters are void, and private rights cannot be acquired in
state-owned submerged lands either by prescription or by adverse
possession.. The decision is also important, however, for what it
230. Note, however, that North Carolina statutorily provides that land raised

above the high water mark as the result of the erection of a pier, jetty, or breakwater vests in the upland property owner. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(a) (1983). The
statutory laws also provide that a private landowner may gain title to filled in
shorelands in several ways: (1) when the filling is to reclaim land previously lost
to erosion, (2) when the land was raised within the bounds of a conveyance by the
state, (3) when the land was raised under lawful permit within the limits of the
State Dredge and Fill Act and Coastal Area Management Act rules, or (4) when
the land was raised as a result of the deposit of spoil from state or federal navigation projects on privately owned lands. Holders of lands raised by filling pursuant
to an easement to fill issued by the state may obtain a quitclaim deed to the filled
area. N.C.

GEN. STAT. §

146-6(b), (c), (d) (1983).

231. See Jernigan, Workshop I (presented to the 7th Annual Submerged
Lands Management Conference) (1988).
232. Id.
233. See Jernigan, Workshop I (presented at the 7th Annual Submerged
Lands Management Conference) (1988). Mr. Jernigan states that "[r]elying on the
Credle decision, the state has intervened in separate lawsuits brought by a private
individual and the RJR Technical Company, a subsidiary of the R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company, contesting title to nearly 2,000 acres of the bed of the Chowan
River, a navigable tributary of the Albermarle Sound. Those parties registered
conflicting claims of fee simple title to the bed of the river, and to exclusive fishPublished by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1989
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did not say. The supreme court confined its ruling strictly within
watery bounds-there is no hint in the opinion that the public
trust doctrine could be widely applied to forests, mountains, historical sites, and the like. Although the court quoted article XIV,
section 5 of the North Carolina Constitution, which in part provides that the state shall "preserve as part of the common heritage
. . .[the] forests, wetlands, estuaries, beaches, historical sites,
open-lands, and places of beauty" and interpreted this to mean
that the Constitution and the public trust doctrine are similar in
concept, it did not state that title to any property other than submerged lands granted out by the state was void.23 4 One concludes
that in North Carolina, unlike other states, the public trust doctrine is aquatic, not amphibious.2 3 Furthermore, by citing to Ward
v. Willis2 36 and Shephard's Point Land Co. v. Hotel,237 both of
which recognize that the legislature may grant out public trust
lands provided that a sufficient public purpose exists, the court implicitly acknowledged that the state has the power to sell its land
ing rights, premised upon state grants issued in 1892." Id. See also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-45.1, which provides:
Title to real property held by the State and subject to public trust
rights may not be acquired by adverse possession. As used in this Section, "public trust rights" means those rights held in trust by the State
for the use and benefit of the people of the State in common. They are
established by common law as interpreted by the courts of this State.
They include, but are not limited to, the right to navigate, swim, hunt,
fish, and enjoy all recreational activities in the watercourses of the State
and the right to freely use and enjoy the State's oceans and estuarine
beaches and public access to the beaches.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45.1 (Supp. 1988).
234. See State v. Credle, 322 N.C. at 532, 369 S.E.2d at 831. But see VA.
CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 3 (1977) (the latter declaring a public trust in oyster beds).
235. See Note, Public Access to Coastal Public Property: Judicial Theories
and the Taking Issue, 67 N.C.L. REV. 627 (1989); Note, Sunbathers Versus Property Owners: Public Access to North Carolina Beaches, 64 N.C.L. REV. 159
(1985). See also Town of Emerald Isle v. State of North Carolina, 320 N.C. 640,
360 S.E.2d 756 (1987); supra notes 64 and 73 and accompanying text.
But, in Concerned Citizens of Brunswick County Taxpayers Assoc. v. North

Carolina, No. 8813SC1075, pending in the court of appeals, the State is arguing
for the right to cross private property and for the inclusion of the dry sand
beaches above the high tide mark, so that people on the beach at high tide could
remain there between the dunes and the high tide mark. See supra note 73 and
accompanying text.
236. 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 183 (1858).
237. 132 N.C. 517. 44 S.E. 39 (1903).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol12/iss1/2
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where necessary.2 38
Third, what private and public uses are protected by the public trust doctrine? In North Carolina, littoral owners may erect
piers and jetties,23 9 but these must be confined to straight lines out
from the waterfront. 40 Where the state is successful in intervening
to claim submerged lands bordering on a littoral owner's property
as subject to the public trust, the citizenry would be free to exercise its common law rights to fish and navigate in the waters. Although as a general rule, for example,4 1 the state has bought or
been donated property for beach access ramps,242 it is now attempting to obtain the right for the public to cross privately owned
property for beach access, as well as the right to remain on the
beach between the dunes and the high tide mark once the tide has
come in.2413
Fourth, what public rights are impressed upon owners whose
property lies upland from public trust tidelands? North Carolina's
coastal wetlands protection laws " impact on littoral owners by requiring permits for certain activities.245 However, some private
rights, such as private shellfish bottoms are protected. 2 " Individu238. The court did not state the factors which would be examined in any
judicial determination of whether such land had been sold for a public purpose,
but one can fairly assume that they would be similar to those considered in other
states. See supra note 112.
239. Barfoot v. Willis, 178 N.C. 200, 100 S.E. 303 (1919); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
146-13 (1983). See supra note 230.
240. Bell v. Smith, 171 N.C. 116, 87 S.E. 987 (1916).
241. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-29 (1987), entitled "Acquisition and Control of State Forests and Parks," which provides for acquisition of forestland
through legislative appropriation, gifts of money or land, and cooperation with
landowners and public agencies.
242. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-134.3 (Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-38
(1983 & Supp. 1988) (land acquisition).
243. See supra note 235.
244. Conservation and Development, N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 113 (1987). See
supra notes 117 to 120 and accompanying text.
245. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-16, 113A-128, et seq. (1987). For example, permits are required for hunting, fishing, trapping, open fires. Permits are also required to dredge or fill in or about estuarine waters or state-owned lakes. Adams
v. N.C. Dep't of Nat'l & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402
(1978); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113-229 (1987). See Schoenbaum, Public Rights and
Coastal Zone Management, 51 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1972).
246. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-208 (1987). At the time State v. Credle was decided, the State had recognized five private oyster bottoms pursuant to N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 113-205.
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als who violate the provisions of the conservation and development
statutes are subject to fines and prison terms. The State v. Credle
decision has an indirect bearing on these laws insofar as the state
may soon find itself in the position of having acquired a great deal
of extra property in trust for the people, which it must oversee and
protect and in which it must regulate the public's common law
activities.
Finally, if one accepts the notion that the public trust doctrine
simply reflects the assertion of public rights that preexist any pri2 7
vate property rights in submerged lands and their resources, '
when, if ever, does a taking occur? Under State v. Credle and Phillips Petroleum, it might appear absolute that fee titles to submerged lands issued before or after statehood 24 8 are invalid in
North Carolina in the face of the public trust doctrine. 2 9 However,
247. Comment, The Fifth Amendment as a Limitation on the Public Trust
Doctrine in Water Law, 15 PAC. L.J. 1291, 1319 (1984) ("The preexisting title
theory of the public trust doctrine asserts retroactively that the water rights
holder never possessed the property, therefore, compensation is not required
when the state acts to protect public trust uses that conflict with the water rights.
This contravenes the mandate of the fifth amendment.").
248. Indeed, one writer concludes that when State v. Credle is read in conjuction with Phillips Petroleum, the following principles of law are absolute:
1. All lands covered by waters of sounds, rivers and creeks in the
coastal counties are held in public trust for the "free use of all its
citizens."
2. Grants of fee title to submerged lands issued before July 4, 1776
are void.
3. Grants of fee title to submerged lands issued by the State since
July 4, 1776 are void.
4. Fee title to the bed of public trust lands cannot be obtained by
adverse possession.
5. Rights to use described areas of public trust lands/waters for limited purposes could be conferred only as authorized by legislative acts.
6. Such rights of use, e.g. piers for access or mooring, shellfish cultivation, and duck blinds, are valid only:
a. for the limited right described in the enabling statute,
b. when supported by a state-issued instrument,
c. when the instrument describes the area claimed, and
d. when the limited right is still being exercised.
7. The conferring of exclusive rights to fish in defined areas of navigable waters has never been authorized under North Carolina law and no
one has such rights.
Hogarth, Public Trust Role of Management, 1 (paper presented at the 7th Annual Submerged Lands Management Conference) (1988).
249. This is not the case in other states. If a title-holder can satisfy a twopronged test: (1) chain of title goes back prior to statehood, and (2) the conveyhttp://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol12/iss1/2
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under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-205, persons who believe that they
have been deprived of their private property without just compensation may file a complaint in the superior court of the county in
which the property is located. If the plaintiff prevails in court, the
North Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Community
Development may, if necessary to conserve the marine and estuarine resources of the state, condemn the property.2 50 The plaintiff
will be paid the monetary worth of the claim as determined by the
trier of fact. 5"
D. PracticalEffects
The practical effects of the State v. Credle decision on the environment and people of North Carolina are quite wide ranging.
The supreme court's reaffirmation of the public trust doctrine as
well as its reiteration that the state owns the shoreland up to the
ordinary high water mark will invalidate local statutes which previously extended a property owner's land to the low water mark.252
Therefore, claims to submerged land grounded solely on such local
statutes will be automatically denied under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113205.253 Thousands of claimants filing under this statute armed with
claims grounded on recorded deeds will be informed that their
deeds are void since the land belongs to the state under the public
trust doctrine.25 One can understand why "shellfish harvesters...
ance included exclusionary possession and use rights as against the public, the
public trust doctrine will not apply to that tidal or submerged land. Summa Corp.
v. California, 466 U.S. 198 (1984); In re Kamakana, 58 Haw. 632, 574 P.2d 1346
(1978); Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mining Board, 317 So. 2d 576 (La. 1974); Klais v.

Danowski, 373 Mich. 262, 129 N.W.2d 414 (1964); Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay,
234 N.Y. 15, 136 N.E. 224 (1922); People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N.Y. 459,
113 N.E. 521 (1916). State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 47 So. 353 (Fla. 1908); East
Haven v. Hemingway, 7 Conn. 186 (1828).
250. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-206 (1987).
251. Id.
252. Article IV of the NEw HANOVER COUNTY CODE, for example, provides:
All deeds or other conveyances of land calling for any creek, river,
sound, ocean or any other body of water as a boundary line or any part
of such boundary, shall convey all land to the low water mark of such
creek, river, sound, ocean or other water-way instead of to the high water
mark.
See Cauffman, supra note 129, at 34.
253. Id. at 35.
254. Id. at 35-36. See also supra note 229.
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dropped their oyster rakes and clenched their hands in anger ' 2 5
when they understood the full import of the State v. Credle decision-submerged lands they had considered as their private property for years and from which they had taken oysters more or less
at will would likely no longer belong to them unless they could
produce a chain of title to a source instrument dating back perhaps
as much as two hundred years.2
E. The Future
The state has until December 31, 1990, to deal with claims to
submerged lands submitted under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113-205.257
One anticipates that the statute's requirement of a survey for each
parcel of claimed property will cause those who could not afford
the high attorneys' fees involved " simply to fail to file claims, so
that title to their claimed lands will devolve upon the state.
Not surprisingly, the claim that the public trust doctrine can
destroy submerged lands will be made. The argument is that the
private owner, because he has a vested interest in protecting his
income, will take better care of oyster bottoms, for example, than
will the state. Because of the paucity of personnel, the state is less
likely to ensure that oystermen do not simply harvest as many oysters as they can, with no thought for future harvests or environmental protection. There may possibly be some truth to this argument, but with the recent heightened public awareness of the
possible ecological destruction of several North Carolina sounds,
one scarcely imagines that the state will stand silently by and
watch the destruction of the oyster bottoms. Indeed, without ex255. See supra note 1.
256. Cauffman, supra note 129, at 18-19. But see N.C. GEN. STAT. 113-206(al)
(amended 23 June 1989) (Marine Fisheries Commission may grant shellfish lease
to a claimant for part or all of area where claim based on oyster or other shellfish
grant or perpetual franchise for shellfish cultivation. If claim based on conveyance
by Literary Fund, Literary Board or Board of Education, and claimant can show
that area cultivated by him or his predecessor in title for the seven years prior to
registration of claim, Marine Fisheries Commission may grant shellfish lease for
area not to exceed ten acres.)
257. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-206(f) (1987).
258. There is a substantial cost involved because attorneys must read many
ancient handwritten deeds and wills, since the indices do not describe the parcels
transferred. In addition, source instruments issued in the 1700s do not reflect the
high and low water marks. Cauffman, supra note 129, at 19 (letter from Attorney
Richard B. Gwathmey, Jr., to NRCD).
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tensive land-use regulation and enforcement, 59 it seems unlikely
that a private owner would consistently make decisions that sufficiently take the public's interest into account.26 0 The public trust
doctrine, backed by statutory law, by implication requires the state
not only to hold the submerged lands in trust for the people, but
also to see that they are properly preserved for future
generations. 6 '
The public trust doctrine has been touted as a useful judicial
tool to use, for example, in gaining access to beaches, protecting
historic sites, and enlarging state-owned forest land. However,
piecemeal judicial decisions in other states have resulted in an undesirable patchwork of rules. In North Carolina, on the other hand,
the Supreme Court has simply reaffirmed the classic interpretation
of the doctrine. Further decisions to expand its scope should be
left to the North Carolina legislature.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In North Carolina, the public trust doctrine serves to prevent
the divestiture of public trust rights in estuarine and coastal areas.
Without it, scarcely a foot of coastal water would remain unclaimed by private individuals, effectively preventing public enjoyment of the beauty and bounty offered there. Further, as scientific
knowledge expands, the wisdom of enforcing a public trust duty to
protect submerged lands for fishing and shellfish harvesting becomes increasingly apparent.
The public trust doctrine is an ancient and venerable concept.
From its beginnings in Roman "natural" law; through its expansion in English common law as a device to wrest the subordination
259. Stanley v. North Carolina Dep't of Conservation & Dev., 284 N.C. 15,
199 S.E.2d 641 (1973).
260. Jarman, supra note 12, at 148. See State ex rel. Rhodes
v. Simpson, No.
525PA88, pending in the North Carolina Supreme Court.
261. The distinction between "jus privatum" and "jus publicum" has often
been cited when defining a State's authority to convey public trust land, and
when describing the rights of the public that remain in public trust land that has
been so conveyed. As the "fee simple absolute" owner of public trust land, a State
owns both interests-the private (jus privatum) andpublic (jus publicum) interests. Beyond those proprietary interests, the state has a separate jus publicum
interest deriving from its sovereignty. From that interest derives the state's power
to regulate and protect the public interest in lands under the public trust. Slade,
The Conveyance of Public Trust Land and the Nature of the Remaining Servitude, supra note 68, at 40.
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of vital fishing, navigational, and commercial rights from the greed
and corruption of the feudal system; to its adaptation to American
topography, it has shown itself to be a flexible and protective mantle for public rights. In North Carolina's submerged lands, the
public trust doctrine is the pearl in the oyster.
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